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Abstract 
 
A possible effect of quantitative easing (QE) undertaken by the United States of America (USA) 
Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) may have been an increase in capital flowing into emerging market 
economies (EMEs). The 2008 global financial crisis created an environment in which traditional 
monetary policies – cutting policy rates – became ineffective in stimulating growth. Faced with this 
policy environment, several high-income countries including the USA resorted to unconventional 
monetary policies notably QE, to grow their economies. While QE was effective in lowering interest 
rates in high-income countries, some argued that investors switched to higher yielding assets, mostly 
EME assets. Therefore, QE is perceived to have increased capital flows into EMEs.  
 
Using a dynamic panel data model with fixed effects this mini-thesis investigates empirically 
whether QE worked through unobservable channels to increase gross private capital inflows to 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) in the period 2000-2015. The study finds 
evidence in support of the view that QE increased capital inflows to EMEs. The results reveal that 
gross private capital inflows to the BRICS increased during the QE intervention period and that the 
increase was higher in the first period of QE than in subsequent QE periods. The empirical results 
also reveal differences in the way types of capital flows responded to QE; portfolio flows, and in 
particular equity flows were the most responsive to QE.  
 
JEL Classification Codes: E52, F21, F30, F32, G01, O19 
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Push factors. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
The core of monetary policy has changed significantly over the past three decades. While money 
targets were the dominant anchor for monetary policy in the early 1980s, they were abandoned by the 
late 1980s owing to the perceived instability of money at the time (Lyonnet & Werner, 2012:94). 
Consequently, several central banks adopted interest rate targets as an anchor for monetary policy. 
However, the interest-rate-based approach encountered a major empirical challenge when successive 
interest rate cuts failed to stimulate economic growth in Japan. Similarly, Joyce, Miles, Scott and 
Vayanos (2012:271) show that with interest rates at or close to zero during the 2008 global financial 
crisis (GFC), the interest rate approach faced further challenges when reductions in the policy rate 
could not influence market rates in the expected way and were thus unable to stimulate growth. The 
ineffectiveness of interest rate cuts to stimulate growth resulted in policy makers in developed 
countries to implement unconventional monetary measures called quantitative easing (QE).  
 
The term QE was first used in 1994 by Professor Richard Werner in his numerous publications in 
which he provided policy recommendations for the recovery of the Japanese economy following the 
recession (Lyonnet & Werner, 2012:96).  Different scholars have applied varying emphases when 
defining QE. For example, Calderon (2012:1) defines QE as a monetary policy aimed at increasing 
the supply of money through purchases of government and agency securities so as to inject capital 
into financial institutions. Others, for instance Chen, Curdia and Ferrero (2011:1) and Blinder 
(2010:2), define QE as a policy implemented to spur real economic activity in periods when 
conventional monetary tools, particularly nominal interest rates, are ineffective as a result of the zero 
lower bound (ZLB) constraint. But regardless of how it is defined, QE aims to ease liquidity and 
credit conditions so as to stimulate borrowing and eventually demand in an ailing economy, as was 
the case in the wake of the 2008 GFC1. 
 
The 2008 GFC resulted in what is considered by many (e.g. Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens & Tong 
2011:271; Mishkin 2011:2) to be the most severe world-wide economic downturn since the great 
                                                   
1
 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of the origin and meaning of QE. 
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depression of the 1930s. As Mishkin (2011:22) shows, what started out as a somewhat manageable 
crisis in the United States (US) real estate market in 2007 grew into a financial crisis that threw not 
only the USA but the world economy into a recession. As the crisis intensified, central banks, 
particularly those in the first world, responded by aggressively cutting policy rates, often to levels 
that were constrained by the ZLB (Minegishi & Cournede, 2010:8). It was hoped that exceptionally 
low interest rates would lower inter-bank borrowing rates, which would then encourage economic 
activity through lower market interest rates. However, Minegishi and Cournede (2010:10) show that 
as uncertainty in the financial markets grew, economic agents became extremely risk averse, with 
most banks simply hoarding liquidity. This behaviour by economic agents reduced the volume of 
transactions and significantly weakened the influence of policy rate reductions on the economy 
(Minegishi & Cournede, 2010:10). Chapter 2 elaborates on this situation.  
 
Faced with this policy environment, there was a growing realisation in most countries, especially 
developed countries, that further monetary stimulus was required to support growth. Klyuev, de Imus 
and Srinivasan (2009:6) indicate that developed-market central banks, first in the United States of 
America (USA) and later overseas, responded by pursuing QE. As Calderon (2012:1) shows, the 
majority of these central banks, albeit to varying degrees, increased their balance sheets dramatically, 
through government bond purchases. The US Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) has to date implemented 
three rounds of QE namely, QE1, QE2 and QE3, corresponding to the first, second and third rounds 
of QE, respectively. According to Hormann and Schabert (2010:1), the expectation was that QE 
would lower long-term interest rates, and thus increase lending and subsequently real economic 
activity. However, Lim, Mohapatra and Stocker (2014:2) argue that this was not the case, as lower 
interest rates caused most investors to switch to higher-yielding assets – most notably emerging 
market economy (EME) assets. Chapter 2 provides a more detailed discussion of this.  
 
Studies such as the one conducted by Fratzscher, Lo Duca and Straub (2013:5) show that although 
QE was successful in inducing investors to reallocate their portfolios in favour of more risky 
domestic assets, it also facilitated rebalancing in favour of foreign assets. Following a sharp decline 
in capital flows during the 2008 GFC, EMEs recorded a sudden surge in capital inflows between 
2009 and 2010 (Ghosh, Kim, Qureshi & Zalduendo, 2012:2). However, by mid-2011 there was a 
sharp reversal of capital flows, depleting most of the EMEs’ foreign currency gains and leaving them 
to deal with rapidly depreciating currencies (ibid.). Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
(BRICS) became the preferred destination for these capitals flows in the aftermath of the 2008 
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financial crisis (BRICS, 2012:43). Bernanke (2010:8) notes that the volatility of capital flows raised 
notable concerns among policy makers in EMEs that accommodative monetary policy in developed 
economies were producing negative spillover effects on their economies.  
 
1.2 The Problem Statement 
 
In the aftermath of the 2008 GFC, QE is argued to have increased the amount of global liquidity and 
capital flows into EMEs, among other things. A growing number of empirical studies (e.g. Burns, 
Kida, Lim, Mohapatra & Stocker, 2014; Lim et al., 2014; Park, Ramayandi & Shin, 2014; Ahmed & 
Zlate, 2013; Fratzcher et al., 2013) find evidence in support of QE effects on capital flows into a host 
of EMEs. These capital flows, which are mostly made up of portfolio investments are prone to 
sudden and volatile movements, thus putting emerging economies at risk of financial instability, 
overheating, exchange rate volatility and inflationary pressures. In the light of these concerns and 
developments this study aims to establish the impact of QE in the US on gross private capital inflows 
to the BRICS economies. 
 
1.3 Study Objectives 
 
As explained above, a number of EME governments expressed concern that QE may have increased 
capital flows into their countries, creating the risk of economic and financial instability, among other 
things. As the BRICS economies were among the EMEs that enjoyed strong growth following the 
GFC, they are believed to have seen an increase in capital inflows into their economies. This study 
aims to establish empirically whether QE increased gross private capital inflows to the BRICS 
economies. In particular, the study aims to address the following objectives: 
 
1. To establish whether QE episodes had any extra effects on gross private capital inflows to the 
BRICS economies over and above what is observed through the traditional drivers of capital 
flows;  
2. To determine which factors – push or pull – were more important in driving capital inflows to 
the BRICS economies;  
3. To examine whether the effects of QE were different for various components of capital 
flows.  
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1.4 Rationale of the Study 
 
Economic theory states that the free flow of capital across national borders generates immense 
benefits for all countries, as it results in an efficient allocation of resources that raises productivity 
and economic growth (Ahmed & Zlate, 2013:1). However, empirical evidence has shown that large 
capital flows can create severe problems for developing and emerging economies. The Asian crisis of 
1997/98, which was partly triggered by an earlier version of QE in Japan, provides an excellent 
example of the risk that rapid capital inflows and subsequent capital reversals may have on EMEs. 
With the inevitable tapering of QE and likely positive improvements in interest rates in high-income 
countries, a much more pervasive problem may await the emerging economies, unless there is a 
much more coordinated and careful handling of the risks associated with QE. 
 
 Understanding the risks associated with unconventional policy instruments such as QE requires in-
depth empirical analyses of its transmission mechanisms, its effectiveness, adverse effects and the 
duration of such effects, among other things. Despite the growing number of studies examining the 
impact of QE on capital inflows to EMEs, the debate on the effects of the Fed’s unconventional 
monetary policy is still ongoing, especially in light of policy normalisation in the USA. This study 
therefore aims to contribute to this debate by investigating the effect of QE on capital inflows to the 
BRICS economies.  
 
1.5 Data and Methodology  
 
The study uses a dynamic panel data model with fixed effects to assess the effect of QE on gross 
private capital inflows to the BRICS economies. This model draws on several studies in the 
literature, both recently and in the past (e.g. Burns et al., 2014; Lim et al., 2014; Park et al., 2014; 
Ahmed & Zlate, 2013; Taylor & Salvano, 1997). A dynamic panel model is generally described as 
one that includes at least one lagged dependent variable. The model includes fixed effects to take 
care of time invariant factors, for example, size and location of the country, which may influence the 
pattern of capital flows. However, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable together with fixed 
effects introduces complications in the estimation of the model and renders standard panel data 
estimates, such as the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator, biased and inconsistent.  
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Nevertheless, several instrumental variable (IV) and general method of moments (GMM) estimation 
approaches have been developed to take care of this complication. Notable examples include: the 
Anderson and Hsiao (AH) (1982) IV, Arellano and Bond (AB) (1991), GMM and the bias-corrected 
LSDV (LSDVC) estimators. This study uses an estimation technique that uses the AB and the 
Blundell and Bond (BB) estimators. A detailed description of the model employed in the study is 
given in Chapter 4.  
 
The main dependent variable of interest, namely gross private capital inflows, hence forth capital 
inflows, is modelled as a function of several push and pull factors, and dummy variables capturing 
the influence of QE. The analyses conducted in this paper are for the period 2000Q1 to 2015Q4. Data 
on capital inflows were obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Balance of Payment 
Statistics (BPS) database and supplemented by bank lending data from the Bank of International 
Settlements’ (BIS) Locational Banking Statistics (LBS). Data on push and pull factors were obtained 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
and national sources. Chapter 3 elaborates in detail on the variables used in this study and their 
sources.  
 
1.6 Ethical Clearance Statement 
 
This study uses official published data and thus eliminates the possibility that ethical standards were 
compromised. Moreover, the researcher adhered strictly to all the rules and regulations required 
when conducting a study of this nature. 
 
1.7 Structure of the Study 
 
The study is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 presents a general introduction and background 
to the study. The chapter also states the objectives and rationale of the study. Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature on the conceptual and theoretical framework underpinning QE. The chapter also presents a 
review of the empirical literature on the effects of QE on emerging market capital inflows. Chapter 3 
presents a review of the most commonly used approaches for examining the impact of QE on capital 
flows. The chapter also describes the estimation techniques related to panel data analysis and outlines 
the baselined model used in the study. It also discusses the variables included in this baseline model.  
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Chapter 4 provides the empirical results of the study. Finally, Chapter 5 summarises the various 
discussions presented in the thesis and offers a conclusion.   
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As indicated in the preceding chapter, this study aims to establish empirically if QE increased capital 
flows to the BRICS economies. Although successful in lowering long-term yields and stimulating 
growth in advanced economies, QE is argued to have increased liquidity in the global economy and 
capital inflows to EMEs. In order to establish a base for the examination of the effect of QE on gross 
private capital inflows to the BRICS, this chapter sets out the theoretical and empirical framework 
for QE.  
 
The chapter begins by defining the key concepts used throughout the study – QE and capital flows. 
The latter includes the factors that drive capital flows – characterised as push and pull factors. This is 
followed by an account of the GFC and how the Fed responded to the recession that followed. This 
discussion serves as a background to the implementation of QE. Finally, this chapter reviews the 
empirical studies on the impact of QE on EMEs in general and the BRICS in particular. The findings 
of most studies suggest a sizeable increase in capital inflows to the BRICS during QE operations. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework  
 
Examining the effects of QE on capital flows requires an understanding of the concept itself. 
Moreover, as most of the factors affecting capital flows are argued to have been affected by QE, it is 
also necessary to have an understanding of capital flows and the various factors that influence their 
pattern. This section is a discussion on two key concepts: QE and capital flows.  
 
2.2.1 Understanding Quantitative Easing 
 
2.2.1.1 The Origin of Quantitative Easing 
 
Lyonnet and Werner (2012:96) have documented the origin of the term QE. According to them, the 
term QE has been used as analogous to an increase in narrow money, often interpreted as ‘printing 
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money’ in the media. The term QE is the literal translation of the Japanese expression “ryōteki 
kanwa”, short for “ryōteki kin’yū kanwa2”. After almost a decade of recession, on 19 March 2001 – 
the day recognised as the first time a central bank conducted QE – the BOJ announced its intention to 
increase the amount of bank reserves it held by 1 trillion yen, to be achieved, in part, by purchasing 
long-term government bonds.   
 
The expression “quantitative easing” was used for the first time in 1994 (before its use by the BOJ) 
by Werner (1994) in his various publications and presentations (Werner, 1995b:3). In his 
publications in the early 1990s Werner (1994) predicted the likely collapse of the banking sector in 
Japan and an imminent economic slow-down (Lyonnet & Werner, 2012:96).  In the following years, 
as the Japanese recession intensified, Werner (1994) made recommendations for economic recovery, 
which he based on a model he created in his earlier work. In these recommendations he stated that 
neither dramatic interest rate cuts, nor fiscal expansion through bond issuance, would end the 
recession (Lyonnet & Werner, 2012:96). 
 
According to Werner (1995a:1; 1995b:2), unless the BOJ implemented a policy that would increase 
the “quantity of credit creation” in the banking sector, the Japanese economy would continue to 
spiral into recession. However, because the longer term “quantity of credit creation” did not translate 
easily into Japanese, Werner (1995b:3) used the expression “quantitative easing” in order to 
emphasise the quantitative nature of the policy. Since then, the phrase QE has been defined much 
more rigorously.  
 
2.2.1.2 Defining Quantitative Easing 
 
Following the use of the term “QE” by Werner (1995b:3), it has been defined more comprehensively 
and precisely by various authors. For example, Palley (2011:2) defines QE as a monetary 
intervention that involves the acquisition of long-term government securities and private sector assets 
by a central bank. Borio and Disyatat (2010:53) emphasise the central bank’s use of its balance sheet 
to directly influence financial markets during periods when the short-term overnight rate is unable to 
do so. Blinder (2010:1) acknowledges that QE entails changing the composition and size of the 
                                                   
2
 The literal English translation “quantitative monetary easing” 
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central bank’s assets and liabilities, but points specifically to the use of QE to improve overall credit 
conditions through increased liquidity.  
 
Likewise, Calderon (2012:1) acknowledges that changes balance sheets of central banks increase 
money supply, and that this increase is achieved through purchases of government bonds and other 
agency securities. Moreover, Calderon (2012:1) argues that by increasing the size and altering the 
composition of their balance sheets, central banks aim to inject capital into financial institutions and 
subsequently increase liquidity and lending. Thus most definitions of QE suggest an increase in 
liquidity in order to improve credit conditions or to encourage lending.  
 
The need for QE has been discussed by several studies (for example Joyce et al., 2012; Fuduka, 
2011; Blinder, 2010; Minegishi & Cournede, 2010). Although monetary policy has for some time 
been anchored on short-term nominal interest rates, Blinder (2010:2) and Borio and Disyatat 
(2010:55) argue that during dire economic conditions cutting the policy rate all the way to zero is 
ineffective in stimulating growth. Mainstream monetary policy typically involves the use of the 
nominal interest rate to provide lending to commercial banks in the interbank market, in order to 
regulate market interest rates and influence the economy (Joyce et al., 2012:271). Under normal 
economic conditions, nominal interest rates are effective in maintaining relatively low and stable 
inflation and in stimulating growth in output.  
 
However, Joyce et al. (2012:272) and Wieland (2009:3) point out that in periods of extreme 
economic conditions, cutting nominal interest rates to influence economic fundamentals is 
impractical due to the ZLB limit. The ZLB is a macroeconomic term that refers to a situation when 
the short-term nominal interest rate is at, or close to, zero – thereby limiting the central bank’s ability 
to influence economic growth.  
 
During economic recessions, when an economy is experiencing deflation, monetary policy makers 
are particularly concerned with reducing the real interest rate in an attempt to enhance aggregate 
demand (Blinder, 2010:2; Wieland, 2009:4). However, as Blinder (2010:2) notes, when nominal 
interest rates reach zero, real interest rates remain stuck at the level of inflation, which is usually low. 
With nominal interest rates stuck at zero and inflation falling further, the real interest rate rises 
further and this in turn reduces aggregate demand.  This vicious cycle of deflation and rising real 
interest rates is what led the central banks in developed countries to implement QE. According to 
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Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011:2) QE allows central banks to influence long-term 
interest rates and therefore encourage economic activity.  
 
Central banks can circumvent the ZLB constraint by purchasing long-term government and private 
agency assets, thereby increasing the liquidity in the financial system. Successive purchases of long-
term government and agency securities raise the price of financial assets and consequently lower 
longer-term interest rates. This argument constitutes the basic logic of QE. Blinder (2010:3) argues 
that, ideally, QE aims to affect long-term rates, because policy makers consider long-term rates as 
having a greater impact on spending than short-term rates. Assuming that arbitrage is imperfect along 
a yield curve, Blinder (ibid.) argues that purchases of government bonds and not short-term treasury 
bills can put significant downward pressure on long-term rates.  
 
2.2.1.3 How Quantitative Easing Influences Capital Flows 
 
While the previous section gave an overall description of how QE influences long-term interest rates, 
this section attempts to describe the intermediate channels along which this influence passes. Unlike 
with standard monetary policies, the channels through which QE influences capital flows are 
somewhat obscure. Nevertheless, the some scholars (e.g. Lim et al., 2014; Fratzscher et al., 2013) 
have identified three key channels through which large-scale asset purchases (LSAP) influence 
capital flows.  
 
2.2.1.3.1 Portfolio Balance Channel 
 
A central channel through which QE affects capital flows is the portfolio balance channel (Lim et al., 
2014:8; Bauer & Neely, 2013:12; Fratzscher et al., 2013:10). Central bank purchases of assets with 
longer durations, usually mortgage-backed bonds, reduce the quantity of these assets in the balance 
sheets of private agencies as they are substituted for safe long-term government bonds. Assuming 
imperfect substitutability between assets, a reduction in the number of longer-duration assets 
increases demand for other risky assets, including those of developing countries, as investors 
rebalance their portfolios (Lim et al., 2014:6). According to Joyce et al. (2011:117), LSAPs by the 
central bank would be expected to lower the return on bonds and lead investors to seek other long-
term risky assets which typically have higher yields, including EMEs’ assets.  
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2.2.1.3.2 Liquidity Channel 
 
In addition to the portfolio balance channel, unconventional monetary policies may also influence 
cross-border capital flows through the liquidity channel. LSAPs by central banks may improve the 
general operations of financial markets and reduce the liquidity premium (Joyce et al., 2011:118). 
The assets purchased through QE operations increase the amount of reserves held by private banks. 
Because reserve balances are more liquid, they are easier to trade than longer-term securities, thereby 
reducing the liquidity premium (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011:6). This allows 
commercial banks to give credit to investors including those from developing countries (Lim et al., 
2014:7).  
 
2.2.1.3.3 Confidence Channel 
 
Unconventional monetary policies can also affect capital flows to EMEs through what is known as 
the confidence channel. This channel captures information about the central bank’s expected policy 
rates and is sometimes referred to as the signalling channel (Joyce et al., 2011:117). QE operations 
have been argued to play a signalling role in the sense that they serve as a more reliable indication of 
monetary authorities’ commitment to maintain future interest rates low (Bauer & Rudebusch, 
2013:9). Lim et al. (2014:8) also observe that in addition to signalling lower future policy rates, QE 
operations also contribute to reducing market volatility and hence economic uncertainty. Stable 
policy rates, reduced market volatility and reduced uncertainty all contribute to bolstering investment 
activities, including those to developing countries.  
 
2.2.2 Capital Flows 
 
The transmission mechanisms of QE discussed above are closely tied to the fundamental factors that 
drive capital flows. For example, the short-term Treasury bill rate and the yield curve have been used 
to proxy for the liquidity and portfolio channels, respectively (Lim et al., 2014:11). The factors 
driving capital flows are generally categorised as push and pull factors (Ahmed, 2015:7). QE, 
particularly in the USA, is argued to have affected several of the drivers of capital flows to EMEs. 
This section presents a discussion of the various factors that influence the pattern of capital flows to 
EMEs.  
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2.2.2.1 What are Capital Flows? 
 
Capital flows refer to transactions that transfer ownership of assets between residents and non-
residents and are recorded in the financial account of the balance of payments (BOP) (Burns et al., 
2014; Lim et al., 2014; Bluedorn et al., 2013; Broner, Didier, Erce & Schmukler, 2013). It is the 
convention in the capital flows literature to distinguish between “gross” and “net” capital flows. 
“Gross capital inflows” arise from the purchase and sale of domestic assets by foreign agents. They 
are recorded as net purchases of domestic assets by foreign agents in the financial account of the 
BOP (Broner et al.  2013:114). In other words, gross inflows are purchases of domestic assets by 
foreign residents (positive inflows) minus sales of domestic assets by foreign residents (negative 
inflows). The latter are recorded as negative inflows, even though intuitively they are outflows, since 
foreign agents are withdrawing funds from the domestic economy.  
 
Conversely, “gross capital outflows” are defined as the net purchases of foreign assets by residents of 
a country. Gross outflows are purchases of foreign assets by residents (positive outflows) minus sales 
of foreign assets by residents (negative outflows) (Bluedorn et al., 2013:7; Broner et al., 2013:114). 
“Gross capital outflows”, just like “gross capital inflows”, is also a net concept, except that it reflects 
the balance of the buying and selling of foreign assets by domestic agents.  
 
The sum of “gross capital inflows” and “gross capital outflows” result in what are known as total 
gross flows. However, the difference between “gross capital inflows” and “gross capital outflows” is 
known as “net capital flows” (Broner et al., 2013:113). According to the IMF (2014:10), net flows, 
unlike gross flows, arise from the actions of both resident and non-resident investors. Net capital 
outflows occur when the acquisition of foreign financial assets by residents exceed the acquisition of 
domestic financial assets by non-residents. Net capital inflows result from an increase in non-
residents’ acquisition of domestic assets or residents’ reduction in the holdings of foreign financial 
assets. Ghosh et al. (2012:3) point out that while it is common to assume that net inflows occur only 
from an increase in non-residents’ holdings of domestic assets, they equally can occur from a 
reduction in residents’ holdings of foreign assets.  
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2.2.2.2 Determinants of Capital Inflows 
 
The economic literature generally groups the determinants of capital flows to EMEs into push and 
pull factors (e.g. in Burns et al., 2014:6; IMF, 2014b:3; Gosh et al., 2012:6). The former refer to 
factors pertaining to source countries and the latter to recipient countries (Nier, Sedik & Mondino, 
2014:3). Push factors reflect financial and real global conditions and other regulatory changes in the 
global economy that affect investors’ propensity to invest in EMEs (Burns et al., 2014:8). These 
include low interest rates, poor economic conditions and lower risk aversion in advanced economies 
(Ghosh et al., 2012:6). Pull factors, on other hand, generally reflect improvements in developing 
countries’ prospects that affect the returns or perceived risks of investing in these countries (Agenor, 
1998:40). These could be improvements in the rates of return, credit ratings, and overall 
macroeconomic and institutional fundamentals. The relative importance of push and pull factors 
remains a topic of debate in the empirical literature, particularly because the significance of the two 
sets of factors differs across EMEs.  
 
2.2.2.2.1 Push Factors 
 
Global Interest Rates 
 
Global interest rates are an important driver of capital flows to emerging economies. When interest 
rates in high-income countries increase relative to those in EMEs, the opportunity cost of investing in 
EMEs’ assets increases such that all things being constant, capital flows to EMEs can be expected to 
fall (Burns et al., 2013:35). Taylor (1997:454) suggests that the increase in capital flowing to EMEs 
in the late 1980s may have been due to the sharp drop in US interest rates during the same period. 
This suggests a negative relationship between capital inflows interest rates a priori.  
 
Another important component of global interest rates is the yield curve, derived by subtracting short-
term yields from long-term yields (Rutherford, 2002:631). Referring to unconventional monetary 
policies in the USA, Powell (2013:4) suggests that the yield curve may capture the influence that QE 
can have on long-term rates of return and therefore on portfolio rebalancing in favour of high-risk 
assets, including developing country assets. A flatter yield curve reduces the incentive to hold longer-
term US assets, thus increasing the chances of rebalancing towards EMEs’ assets in search of higher 
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yields. The IMF (2014:6) argues that this is particularly true for banks that often borrow short-term 
and lend long-term; a flatter yield curve, which implies a smaller gap between long- and short-term 
interest rates, is likely to trigger outflows in search of higher yields (IMF, 2014a:4). Thus a flatter 
yield curve is likely to result in more capital flows into EMEs, also suggesting a negative coefficient. 
 
Global Liquidity 
 
Aside from global interest rates, studies (e.g. Burns et al., 2014:28; Lim et al., 2014:28) have found 
global liquidity to be an important determinant of capital flows to EMEs. Money supply is often used 
as a proxy for global liquidity or available financing. Greater availability of financing reduces the 
liquidity premium (the compensation demanded by investors for holding illiquid assets) and raises 
the yields on liquid assets. An increase in the yields on liquid assets leads investors to substitute 
developing country assets with US assets suggesting a decrease in capital flows into developing 
countries (negative coefficient) (Burns et al., 2014:36).  
 
Global Uncertainty and Risk Aversion 
 
Global uncertainty and risk aversion also play a significant role in shaping the behaviour of capital 
flows to EMEs. Global risk is underpinned by macroeconomic fundamentals, financial market 
participants’ risk attitudes and possibly monetary policy in high-income countries (IMF, 2014a:6). 
Monetary easing in high-income countries, for example, reduces investors’ perception of risk, and 
this is likely to be accompanied by an increase in capital inflows to EMEs. Capital inflows to EMEs 
plunged during the financial panic that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and again 
in the second half of 2011 and May 2012, when the debt crisis in Europe worsened. These examples 
suggest an inverse relationship between global risk aversion and capital inflows to EMEs.    
 
Global Growth   
 
Global growth is used to capture the influence of real global economic conditions on capital inflows 
to EMEs. Global growth represents the real incentives for investing in EMEs’ assets and is typically 
proxied by the weighted average real GDP growth of advanced economies. Stronger growth in 
advanced economies is likely to increase investment opportunities in general, therefore also in EMEs, 
and hence increased capital flows to EMEs. However, as seen in Burns et al. (2014:36), the 
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relationship between growth in high-income countries and capital inflows to emerging economies 
can be ambiguous. This is because, in addition to increasing capital flows to EMEs, faster and stable 
growth can make developed countries an attractive destination for financial investments, thereby 
discouraging investments in EMEs’ assets. Moreover, others (e.g. Chen, Curdia, & Ferrero, 2011:4) 
have found positive effects of QE on US and global growth. 
 
2.2.2.2.2 Pull Factors 
 
Interest Rate Differentials 
 
Differences in interest rates between high and low income countries also play a huge role in 
explaining the behaviour of capital inflows (Nier et al., 2014:6). Interest rate differentials determine 
the attractiveness of domestic assets relative to foreign assets, and hence cross-border capital flows 
(IMF, 2014b:6). Neoclassical economic theory states that capital should respond to differences in 
rates of returns between countries (Ghosh et al., 2012:7). This typically implies that capital should 
move from capital-abundant advanced countries with low rates of return to capital-scarce emerging 
economies with high rates of return.  
 
Rates of return are typically high in developing countries compared to major financial markets in 
high-income countries reflecting the high risk associated with developing country assets (Taylor, 
1997:454). The interest rate differential captures such differences in short-term returns between 
EMEs and high-income countries. A positive interest rate differential reflects what theory says about 
returns in EMEs – they are usually higher than those in developed countries. During the post-crisis 
period a number of EME central banks raised their policy rates, while those in developed countries 
generally reduced their policy rates to levels nearing the ZLB (Ahmed & Zlate, 2013:12). The result 
of this was an increase in the return differential.  
 
The easing of monetary policy in high-income countries causes interest rates there to fall prompting 
financial investors to reallocate their portfolios in favour of assets with higher rates of return, most 
notably EMEs’ assets (Powell, 2013:4). This results in an increase in capital inflows to EMEs. 
Likewise, higher interest rates in EMEs can draw capital flows from high-income countries. This 
suggests a positive coefficient on the interest rate differential variable. 
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Economic Growth Differentials 
 
Differences in growth prospects between developing and developed countries are an important 
determinant of cross-border capital flows (Powell, 2013:5). When investing in any country, and 
especially in developing countries, investors consider the growth prospects in those countries as these 
affect the long-term return on their investment (Nier et al., 2014:6). The literature (e.g. Burns et al., 
2014; Lim et al., 2014; Ahmed & Zlate, 2013) shows that higher growth differentials between high-
income countries and EMEs are associated with more capital flows to EMEs. Powell (2013:5) notes 
that the growth in capital inflows to EMEs after the GFC coincided with stronger growth in the 
EMEs relative to advanced economies. This suggests a positive coefficient a priori. 
 
Sovereign Credit Ratings 
 
Sovereign credit ratings have also been identified as an important factor explaining the behaviour of 
capital flows into EMEs. Several studies (e.g. Burns et al., 2014; Lim et al., 2014; Park et al., 2014; 
Ahmed & Zlate, 2013; Kim & Wu, 2008) include EMEs’ sovereign credit ratings as one of the 
variables their analyses. Sovereign credit ratings reflect a number of important aspects of a country 
including economic growth, debt, inflation and the ability of individual countries to repay their debt 
(Kim & Wu, 2008:17). Moreover, as Bhatia (2002:4) points out, not only do sovereign credit ratings 
indicate a sovereign’s ability to repay debt, but it also shows the country’s willingness to pay-back 
debt. In other words, investors can gain insight into the quality of policies and institutions in a 
country from its credit rating (Burns et al., 2014:38). In addition, they capture important aspects 
related to the opportunities and risks associated with investing in a developing country.  
 
Empirical evidence suggests that an emerging economy with a favourable credit rating is likely to 
attract capital inflows, suggesting a positive coefficient a priori. For example Kim and Wu (2008:5) 
find that all the components of capital flows – that is FDI, portfolio and bank flows – to EMEs 
increased as long-term credit ratings improved in those countries. Improvements in short-term 
ratings, on the other hand, are found to be detrimental to capital flows, as they encourage 
governments to substitute long-term debt for short-term debt resulting in liquidity risks (ibid.).  
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The list of push and pull factors presented above does not constitute an exhaustive list. Several 
variables can be used as proxies for push and pull factors. Various studies have experimented with 
additional factors that can possibly affect the pattern of capital flows in addition to those listed above. 
However, this study only considers these factors listed above, as will be seen in Chapters 3 and 4. 
This decision is largely guided by the factors that have been identified as having statistically 
significant effects on capital flows in empirical work (e.g. Burns et al., 2014 & Lim et al., 2014).  
 
2.3 Empirical Literature Review 
 
Drawing on the theoretical framework discussed in Section 2.2, this section reviews the empirical 
literature on QE. First, an overview of the factors that may have caused the GFC and the 
consequences thereof are given to serve as background to the implementation of QE. Second, the 
policy responses of developed countries, including QE, are discussed in the following subsection. 
Lastly, the section reviews the literature on policy’s impact on capital flows to the BRICS and EMEs 
in general.  
 
2.3.1 Causes of the Global Financial Crisis 
 
The recession that followed the 2008 GFC is considered by many (e.g. Joyce et al., 2011:22; 
Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011:1; Mishkin, 2011:2) to be one of the worst worldwide recessions since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. As shown by Mishkin (2011:22) and Allen and Carletti (2009:1), 
what began as problems in the US real estate market spread rapidly to the financial markets and later 
to the real economy. According to Acharya and Richardson (2009:195), there is almost universal 
consensus that the principal cause of the crisis was an unprecedented increase in the supply of credit, 
which fuelled a housing price bubble.   
 
Several reasons account for the growth in credit supply and the collapse of the US housing market. 
Firstly, Acharya and Richardson (2009:195) remark on the dramatic increase in the US debt to 
national income ratio from 3.75:1 in 2002, to a record high of 4.75:1 in 2007. This increase in debt 
was fuelled by a range of policies intended to create incentives for the poor to purchase houses, 
including tax deductions on mortgage interest payments, among other things (Allen and Carletti, 
2009: 6). Jickling (2009:2) argues that these factors, together with growing global demand, especially 
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in Asia, for US mortgage-backed securities (MBS), eased US credit conditions considerably. Lax 
credit conditions increased the demand for US houses and consequently led to a dramatic increase in 
US house prices (Ibid.). House prices grew at an extraordinary rate of 11 percent annually, until they 
reached their peak in 2006 and then began to fall (Acharya and Richardson, 2009:196).  
 
Apart from the credit boom and the bursting of the housing bubble, there are other factors that caused 
the financial crisis. Crotty (2009:565) argues that favourable developments in the real estate market 
created perverse incentives among key players in almost all the financial institutions, including 
commercial and investment banks, to take on more risk than they normally would. McCarthy 
(2009:1) points to the way that commercial banks and in some instances mortgage brokers issued 
loans (mortgages) to less credit-worthy borrowers (home owners) with a high default risk, known as 
subprime mortgages.  
 
Moreover, securitisation of these mortgages, which resulted in what are called mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS), gave further impetus to the rapid growth of credit markets. Estimates show that 
securitisation grew from about US$767 billion in the last quarter of 2001 to a record high US$1.4 
trillion in December 2006 (Archarya & Richardson, 2009:196). According to Jobst (2008:1), 
securitisation is a process through which particular types of financial assets are pooled by financial 
institutions (e.g. investment banks) and transformed into securities using some financial 
restructuring. One innovation in this regard was the ‘originate and distribute’ model.   
 
Prior to the securitisation of mortgages through the ‘originate and distribute’ model, mortgages were 
originated and held by brokers and commercial banks. However, Allen and Carletti (2009:3) show 
that under the ‘originate and distribute model’ mortgages originated by brokers and commercial 
banks were sold to financial entities, usually investment banks, for securitisation. The authors (ibid.) 
point out that these mortgages were secured by claims on the properties of the borrowers, usually 
houses, whose prices were at the time escalating.  
 
According to Crotty (2009:565), the rapid growth of securitisation created serious repercussions for 
the entire global financial system when the market for asset-backed securities collapsed in 2007. 
Crotty (2009:565) and Jickling (2009:3) argue that several of the players in the financial markets 
contributed to the creation and sale of bad assets, and felt secure that they would not be held 
accountable for their actions. The conduct of rating agencies was partly responsible for the 
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deteriorating quality of these assets. As pointed out by Acharya and Richardson (2009:196), rating 
agencies graded a host of subprime MBS “AAA”, making these assets even more appealing to 
investors. The actions of the rating agencies were in part the result of the use of inefficient economic 
models, conflict of interest as some of the agencies were interested in generating fees, and also in 
part because of the lack of effective regulation (Jickling, 2009:3). The heavy reliance on agency 
ratings as a criterion for selecting investments has been identified as a major contributor to the crisis.  
 
While rating agencies contributed significantly to the GFC, ultimately it was the behaviour of the 
large, complex financial institutions (LCFIs), in particular investment banks that aggravated the 
problems in the financial sector. According to Acharya and Richardson (2009:200) and Crotty 
(2009:568) LCFIs often had to retain the riskiest part of the securities – commonly known as “toxic 
waste” – in order to assure potential investors that the assets being issued were safe.  
 
In addition to reducing moral hazard, LCFIs held on to risky assets, for example, the collateralised 
debt obligations (CDOs), for the simple reason that they could be maintained off-balance-sheet and 
were thus not subject to capital adequacy requirements (Archarya & Richardson, 2009:200).  This 
allowed LCFIs to take on more risky loans, raising considerably the concentration of risk held by 
these institutions, leading Jickling (2009:3) to conclude that the ‘originate to distribute model’ 
created to manage risk itself became a creator of substantial risk.  
 
Following the bursting of the housing price bubble that led to a series of subprime defaults, Acharya 
and Richardson (2009:207) note that the value of MBS plummeted sharply, leaving LCFIs with little 
choice but to include the assets held in the off-balance-sheet on their balance sheets. McCarthy 
(2009:10) and Crotty (2009:568) note that a combination of mortgage defaults and balance sheets 
filled with devalued asset-backed securities severely reduced bank capital. This led most banks, 
particularly the largest and most renowned in the world, to declare insolvency since they held less 
capital compared to their liabilities (Jicking, 2009:3).  Moreover, giant investment banks that had 
accumulated distressed AAA-ranked MBS – for example the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS), 
Fannie Mae, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Freddie Mac – also declared insolvency (Archarya 
& Richardson, 2009:208).  
 
According to McCarthy (2009:5), the huge losses resulting from distressed assets and the collapse of 
the major financial institutions set off a financial panic that spread to global financial markets. 
20 
 
Contagion set in as market participants became extremely risk averse, bringing the operations of 
financial markets almost to a stop (Archarya & Richardson, 2009:209). The panic in the financial 
markets significantly reduced credit, thus increasing the effect of the crisis on the real economy 
(Archarya & Richardson, 2009:196). Moreover, households that had accumulated unsustainable 
levels of debt in relation to their ability to service the debts also saw a rapid fall in their net worth 
(McCarthy, 2009:10).  
 
In spite of concerted efforts by policy makers to contain the financial panic, Jickling (2009:1) argues 
that the financial crisis intensified in 2008, causing a deep recession first in the USA, then other 
developed countries and eventually the rest of the world. In the USA alone quarterly growth of 
industrial output decreased by close to 11.7 percentage points between the first and last quarters of 
2008 (McCarthy, 2009:10). In the euro area growth in industrial output fell by 18.7 percentage points 
in 2008 alone (ibid.). According to McCarthy (2009:11), in Japan the decline in output growth was 
even more dramatic, from –2.8 percent to –39.9 percent in the first and last quarters of 2008, 
respectively.   
 
The GFC had far-reaching consequences that spilled over into the global financial and real sectors, 
leaving the world economy to grapple with a severe recession. Inevitably, authorities world-wide 
were confronted with an urgent need to generate significant policy responses. Because of the nature 
of the recession, a number of developed countries responded with unprecedented policies.   
 
2.3.2 Responses to the Global Financial Crisis 
 
2.3.2.1 Traditional Monetary Policies 
 
As the financial crisis worsened in the developed world, falling output and aggregate demand elicited 
unprecedented policy reactions from developed-country central banks (Lim et al., 2014:5). The US 
Federal Reserve Bank – together with the central banks of other major developed countries – 
responded by rapidly cutting policy rates often to levels effectively constrained by the ZLB. 
Moreover, some of the central banks openly pledged to keep policy rates at extremely low levels for 
a long period of time (Minegishi & Cournede, 2010:5). 
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These extremely low policy rates were expected to reduce the cost of borrowing for banks and 
consequently stimulate real economic activity through lower lending rates (Lim et al., 2014:5 and 
Minegishi & Cournede, 2010:8). However, the state of the financial markets during the 2008 crisis 
severely limited this transmission mechanism of traditional monetary policy. This was attributed to 
two main reasons. Firstly, Fawley and Neely (2013:51) observe that nominal interest rates are in 
effect constrained by zero; with policy rates at or near zero, policy makers were left with little choice 
but to consider other forms of monetary policy.  
 
Secondly, the usual channel of influence of traditional monetary tools was weakened by the turmoil 
in the financial system itself. According to Joyce et al. (2012:272), the huge amounts of losses that 
were incurred after the bursting of the housing bubble left key financial institutions insolvent and 
called into question the credibility of borrowers in the capital markets. Minegishi and Cournede 
(2010:9) argue that as a result of these disruptions, financial institutions became extremely uncertain 
about their liquidity needs and at the same time became extremely risk averse, causing money market 
rates to rise significantly.  Moreover, with most banks hoarding liquidity, the volume of financial 
transactions shrank significantly. As Joyce et al. (2012:272) argue the end result was a breakdown in 
the typical relationship between policy rates and market rates.  
 
The breakdown in the usual relationship between policy rates and market rates, and the ZLB limit on 
interest rates, led to the conclusion that conventional monetary policy was ineffective in bringing 
about economic recovery. Successive cuts in the policy rates failed to influence market rates in the 
usual way, and the breakdown in financial intermediation implied that the usual channel of influence 
of interest rates had been compromised (Minegishi & Cournede, 2010:9; Joyce et al., 2012:272). 
This challenge facing central banks in developed countries led them to consider QE (QE) (Lim et al., 
2014:5). 
 
2.3.2.2 Unconventional Monetary Policy 
 
Given the breakdown in the relationship between policy rates and market rates, and given that 
financial conditions still required further stimulus, policy makers in developed countries explored a 
range of unconventional measures. These measures were classified into four broad categories: 1) 
increasing liquidity provision to financial institutions; 2) direct intervention into the broader financial 
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market; 3) LSAPs; and 4) direct support to particular financial institutions (Minigeshi & Cournede, 
2010:7). As Fratzscher, Lo Duca and Straub (2013:7) argue, these measures, which have been widely 
labelled as QE, significantly changed the composition and size of developed-country central bank 
balance sheets.  
 
The aim of QE as it was originally implemented by the BOJ was to increase liquidity in the banking 
system by directly purchasing government securities from banks (Joyce et al., 2012:274). Joyce et al. 
(ibid.) argue that by injecting enough cash reserves into the banking system, the BOJ hoped that the 
reserves would ultimately encourage credit creation, stimulate real activity and help push asset prices 
up, and consequently minimise deflationary pressures. After the 2008 GFC, with interest rates at or 
close to zero, the Fed – the most active – the ECB, the BOE and the BOJ began to pursue non-
standard monetary measures in the form of QE, albeit at varying levels (Fawley & Neely, 2013:52).  
 
Fawley and Neely (2013:51) investigate the motivation for QE programmes of the Fed, BOJ, BOE 
and the ECB. They find that the initial motivation of all four central banks was to eliminate financial 
distress and improve the operations of financial institutions by providing adequate liquidity to these 
institutions. However, Fawley and Neely (ibid.) and Zhu (2012:13) argue that, as the crisis 
intensified, the objectives of these policies broadened to include reaching inflation targets, lowering 
borrowing costs and easing credit conditions so as to promote economic growth and employment.  
 
This study focuses on unconventional monetary policies conducted in the USA as the Fed has been 
one of the most active central banks in implementing QE policies. QE in the USA primarily took the 
form of large-scale financial asset purchases (LSAPs) over three episodes between 2008 and 2013 
(Lim et al., 2014:5). The first round of QE (QE1) was conducted from December 2008 to 2009. This 
round of QE was primarily aimed at improving the operations of financial markets (Fratzscher et al., 
2013:2). During QE1 the Fed purchased assets totalling US$1,722 trillion (Moore, Nam, Suh & 
Tepper, 2013:6). The Fed purchased US$1.25 trillion Agency MBS, US$172 billion of Agency debt 
and US$300 billion of Treasury securities (Moore, Nam, Suh & Tepper, 2013:6; Zhu, 2012:13;).  
 
The second round of QE (QE2) took place from November 2010 to June 2011. This round of QE saw 
the Fed buying additional longer-term Treasury bonds worth US$600 billion (Fratzscher et al., 
2013:2). The principal aim of QE2 was to lower bond yields as well as to increase the prices of assets 
in riskier market segments (Zhu, 2012:13). In so doing, the Fed hoped to encourage real economic 
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activity through positive welfare effects. The third round of QE (QE3) was launched in late 2012 and 
ended in the second quarter of 2013. QE3 focused on monthly purchases of US$40 billion MBS and 
US$45 billion Treasury securities, which expanded Fed’s assets by almost US$1 trillion by quarter 
three of 2013 (Lim et al., 2014:37). All three episodes of QE had varying effects on US financial 
markets and financial markets worldwide.  
 
For example, Zhu (2012:13) finds that the announcement of QE1 resulted in sizeable reductions in 
corporate bond yields and depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) of the US 
dollar. Others like Fratzscher et al. (2013) and Fratzscher (2012) find that QE1 measures resulted in 
significant increases in bond and equity prices, and that they lowered long-term bond and equity rates 
of return in the USA. According to Fratzscher (2012:342), higher bond and equity prices in the USA 
induced significant capital movements from EMEs in favour of US securities, resulting in the 
appreciation of the US dollar. In contrast, Treasury bond purchases under QE2 pushed-up equity and 
bond prices worldwide, causing substantial capital movements out of bond markets in the US and 
other advanced economies into EME equity markets in search of yields and higher returns 
(Fratzscher et al., 2013:2).  
 
2.4 Effect of Quantitative Easing on Capital Flows to the BRICS Economies 
 
The extended rounds of QE in the USA and other developed countries raised concerns among several 
EMEs and developing countries of potential spillover effects, especially through increased cross-
border capital flows. These concerns were not unfounded as aggregate gross capital inflows grew 
substantially between 2009 and 2013 (Lim et al., 2014:5). This section summarises the findings of 
studies that have examined the effects of QE on capital flows to EMEs in general and in particular 
the BRICS economies. The section begins with a brief description of the BRICS countries.  
 
2.4.1 Defining the BRICS countries 
 
The acronym BRIC was used for the first time in 2001 to represent the alliance between the major 
emerging economies, namely Brazil, Russia, India and China (Singh & Dube, 2013:5). The acronym 
was coined by O’Neill (2001:6) in a Goldman Sachs paper titled, “Building Better Global Economic 
BRICs”, which examined the growth prospects of the BRIC economies. O’Neill (2001:3) predicted a 
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growing share of the BRICs in world GDP, from approximately 23.3 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in 
2011.  
 
South Africa joined the BRIC alliance in 2010, thereby expanding the BRIC acronym to BRICS 
(Blais, Purcell & Caldwell, 2012:93). Since then, the acronym has been used to represent Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa. According to Blais et al. (2012:93), the BRICS, when viewed 
together, have risen to the fore over the past two decades as a significant force to reckon with, largely 
because of their growing market share and abundant resources. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
measured in current prices more than doubled for each BRICS country between 2000 and 2014 (see 
Figure 2.1). However, collectively, the share of BRICS economies in global GDP is reported to have 
fallen to 22 percent in 2015 (BRICS, 2015:42).  
 
                       Figure 2.1: Gross Domestic Product (Current Million US$) 
 
Source: Own Construction Using Data from the BRICS 2015 Statistical Publication 
 
The increasing importance of the BRICS economies in the global economy made these countries the 
preferred destination of capital flows after the GFC (Munhoz, de Paula Pereira & de Deus, 
2013:466). The GFC, which started in the USA and spread to other high-income countries, also 
affected the BRICS economies. The 2012 BRICS Report gives an overview of the effects of the GFC 
on the BRICS. The report shows that the crisis resulted in substantial losses in output in all the 
BRICS countries, with Russia experiencing the sharpest fall in growth. It also reports that rising 
 -  2,000  4,000  6,000  8,000  10,000  12,000
Brazil
Russia
India
China
South Africa
Brazil Russia India China South Africa
2014 2,346 1,881 2,069 10,361 350
2000 657 260 477 1,205 136
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global risk aversion resulted in rapid capital flow reversals from the BRICS, leaving their financial 
markets vulnerable. Notwithstanding the decline in output, a combination of prudent fiscal and 
monetary policies saw the BRICS economies emerge more resilient to the crisis than other emerging 
economies (BRICS, 2012:87).  
 
Several factors and in particular accommodative monetary policies in developed countries are argued 
to have resulted in the rebalancing of international investment portfolios in favour of EMEs’ assets. 
This is discussed in the next section.  
 
2.4.2 Capital Flows to the BRICS Countries 
 
Even though QE was meant to promote growth in developed countries, Lim et al. (2014:2) argue that 
the policy had profound implications for developing countries. The authors’ note that with interest 
rates at the ZLB in the USA and other major developed countries, investors began to consider other 
sources of yield. EMEs and in particular the BRICS, having enjoyed significant growth and stable 
political-economic environments since 2000, became the preferred destination for investment.  
 
Consequently, EMEs and the BRICS in particular saw an increase in capital flows after 2000. Figure 
2.2 below shows the pattern of cumulative gross inflows to the BRICS countries during the period 
2000-2015. Capital inflows to the BRICS economies rose from a modest US$35 billion in the first 
quarter of 2000 to US$222 billion in the first quarter of 2013, representing an increase of almost 534 
percent (see Figure 2.2). After growing moderately, capital inflows to the BRICS fell sharply at the 
start of 2008, from US$125 billion in the last quarter of 2007 to US$27 billion at the beginning of 
2008. They rose sharply to US$172 billion around the third quarter of 2008 and fell sharply again at 
the start of the GFC. In the latter half of 2009 capital flows to these countries grew sharply, driven 
largely by the strong economic recovery in these economies. Ahmed and Zlate (2013:5) observe a 
similar pattern for a subset of EMEs.  
 
As the global economic outlook worsened with the intensification of the European debt crisis, capital 
inflows to EMEs reduced significantly in the latter part of 2011, leaving policymakers in EMEs to 
deal with rapidly depreciating currencies (Ahmed & Zlate, 2013:5). Similarly, the BRICS recorded a 
sharp decline in capital inflows during quarter three of 2011, but rose towards the close of 2011 and 
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early 2012 (see Figure 2.2). This growth is partly attributed to the easing of financial conditions in 
the advanced economies, which improved investors’ perception. Overall, gross capital flows to the 
BRICS have remained volatile since 2008.   
 
           Figure 2.2: Total Gross Inflows to BRICS Countries (Billion US$) 
 
              Source: Author’s Own Construction using IMF BPS data 
 
An analysis of the behaviour of the distinct components of gross capital flows to the BRICS 
countries reveals some interesting patterns. Figure 2.3 shows gross capital inflows disaggregated by 
type of flow. Portfolio and bank flows were very volatile compared to FDI flows, which have 
remained fairly stable over the period. Figure 2.3 shows significant volatility in bank lending, 
although smaller in magnitude. Similarly, portfolio flows to the BRICS economies remained volatile 
especially during the global financial crisis. Portfolio inflows fell sharply in 2008; they turned 
negative in Russia, India and South Africa. In contrast to portfolio flows and bank lending, FDI 
inflows remained fairly stable during the financial crisis, reflecting the positive outlook on growth 
and the soundness of the financial system. FDI inflows grew substantially in all the BRICS countries. 
The increase in FDI flows was more substantial for China (BRICS, 2012:44). FDI inflows fell in 
mid-2008 but rebounded towards the end of 2010. 
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2
0
0
0
Q
1
2
0
0
0
Q
4
2
0
0
1
Q
3
2
0
0
2
Q
2
2
0
0
3
Q
1
2
0
0
3
Q
4
2
0
0
4
Q
3
2
0
0
5
Q
2
2
0
0
6
Q
1
2
0
0
6
Q
4
2
0
0
7
Q
3
2
0
0
8
Q
2
2
0
0
9
Q
1
2
0
0
9
Q
4
2
0
1
0
Q
3
2
0
1
1
Q
2
2
0
1
2
Q
1
2
0
1
2
Q
4
2
0
1
3
Q
3
2
0
1
4
Q
2
2
0
1
5
Q
1
2
0
1
5
Q
4
QE1 QE2 QE3 
27 
 
   Figure 2.3: Total Gross Inflows to BRICS Countries, Components (Billion US$)  
 
Source: Author’s own construction using IMF BPS data 
 
Capital flows to EMEs have generally remained volatile, especially in the years after the 2008 GFC 
(Figure 2.2). While such volatility in capital flows to EMEs is nothing new, as shown by historical 
experience, Ghosh et al. (2012:3) argue that recent events in the advanced economies, in particular 
QE policies in the USA, resulted in a renewed interest in the drivers of capital flows to EMEs. 
Debates concerning what determines capital flows date back as far as the mid-1930s, when the USA 
was contending with rapidly rising capital inflows. These debates were responsible for the 
establishment of the post-war “international monetary order” and the IMF’s Articles of Agreement 
(Qureshi, 2012:2). A similar debate resumed in the 1990s, when the liberalisation of capital flows in 
EMEs, particularly those in Latin America and Asia, saw a rapid rise in private portfolio flows from 
foreign investors.  
  
Recent literature on the factors driving capital flows reveals that capital flows respond to a number of 
push and pull factors. Byrne and Feiss (2011:4) find that US long-run real interest rates significantly 
influence the pattern of capital flows to EMEs. Differences in interest rates between the USA and 
EMEs contributed to the flow of capital in search of higher yields (Ahmed & Zlate, 2013:12). Ghosh 
et al. (2012:14) show that capital flow surges to EMEs corresponded with lower interest rates and 
global risk perception in the USA. Figure 2.4 below shows the difference between nominal policy 
rates in the BRICS and the USA. Even though interest rate differentials fluctuated in the period 2002-
2012, they were positive in favour of the BRICS.  
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           Figure 2.4: Policy Interest Rates (%) 
 
              Source: Author’s Own Construction using IMF IFS data 
 
Differences in growth rates between advanced and developing countries have also been cited as a 
possible explanation for the growth in capital flows to emerging economies. According to Ghosh et 
al. (2012:9), rapidly growing economies such as the BRICS have a higher probability of receiving 
huge capital flows, because they are likely to have large financial needs, greater potential for high 
productivity and returns, as well as good institutional capacity. What Chinn (2012:9) calls the ‘two-
speed recovery’, where emerging economies recovered faster than advanced economies from the 
GFC, is partly responsible for huge capital flows to EMEs in the last decade. For example, Ghosh et 
al. (2012:14) demonstrate that during capital flow surges, output was growing rapidly and the current 
and capital accounts of recipient countries tended to be more open in general.  
 
Figure 2.5 shows that real growth rates in the BRICS countries (blue line) have been constantly 
higher than in the USA (red line). Figure 2.5 also shows that the growth differential widened between 
2009 and 2010, reflecting faster recovery in these countries. Ahmed and Zlate (2013:11) observed a 
similar pattern for a subset of EMEs.  
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           Figure 2.5: Real GDP Growth (%) 
 
              Source: Author’s Own Construction using IMF IFS data 
  
The BRICS Report (2012:43) shows that in the BRICS countries both global and domestic factors 
were important in explaining the growth in capital inflows.  External factors included excess global 
liquidity and lower interest rate regimes pursued in the advanced economies. In addition, an 
improvement in investor confidence towards the EMEs and the search for higher yields are said to 
have led to the rebalancing of capital flows in favour of EMEs. The BRICS Report (2012:44) also 
shows that while domestic factors such as the longer-term view on growth were important in 
explaining FDI flows to the BRICS, portfolio and equity flows were largely explained by global risk 
factors and, more recently, QE.  
  
2.4.3 The Impact of Quantitative Easing on Capital Flows to EMEs 
 
Until recently very few studies had attempted to test empirically the effect of QE on capital flows to 
EMEs. Ahmed and Zlate (2013:4) note that most discussions on unconventional monetary policies in 
the West are based on findings of studies examining the effect of long-term US interest rates, on 
capital flows. For example Fratzcher et al. (2012) and Zhu (2012) consider the impact of the Fed’s 
announcements of QE programmes on EMEs’ financial markets and not on their actual operations. A 
few exceptions (e.g. Burns et al., 2014; Lim et al., 2014; Fratzcher et al., 2013) model actual QE 
operations and balance sheet changes.  
 
The empirical literature on the effect of QE on capital flows to EMEs are generally categorised into 
three groups. The first group includes studies that modelled the Fed’s QE announcements using event 
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study methods. These studies (e.g. Fratzcher et al., 2013; Zhu, 2012;) examined the behaviour of 
financial assets in specified time windows around the Fed’s QE announcements. For example, one of 
the key findings of Fratzcher et al. (2013:6) suggests that the Fed’s announcement of QE operations 
had smaller effects in general on capital flows than actual Fed operations. These results further 
suggest that investors’ reactions were not only based on Fed announcements, but on other factors too. 
A major caveat to these studies is that they focused on the period preceding the 2008 GFC, and hence 
do not cover the period during which unconventional monetary policies were pursued (Ahmed & 
Zlate, 2013:5).   
 
In contrast to modelling the Fed’s announcements, the second group of studies (e.g. Burns et al., 
2014; Lim et al., 2014; Fratzcher et al., 2013) model actual QE interventions within a panel data 
framework. These studies, in addition to examining the effect of QE, also examine the relevance of 
push and pull factors in explaining the behaviour of capital flows. What distinguishes these studies 
from others is that they analyse the impact on foreign markets, including EMEs, of actual market 
operations and not just the announcements of the Fed’s asset purchases.  
 
Fratzcher et al. (2013:5) find significant differences between the impact of QE1 and QE2 on net 
private capital inflows to 65 countries, including EMEs. They find that the first phase of QE 
contributed significantly to the decline in long-term yields in the USA and the rest of the global 
economy. They also find that QE1 led a number of investors to reallocate their portfolios in US 
equity and bond funds, and consequently contributed to the appreciation of the US dollar. These 
results appear consistent with the sharp drop in capital inflows to EMEs in the latter part of 2008 
(Figure 2.2), a period during which investor uncertainty had heightened, especially following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. Fratzcher et al. (2013:6) find that, in contrast to QE1, the QE2 
measures, particularly US Treasury purchases announced in 2009, were generally ineffective in 
lowering yields outside the USA. This caused substantial capital outflows from global bond markets 
in favour of EME equities as well as an overall depreciation of the US dollar.  
 
Burns et al. (2014:7) find that all three episodes of QE led to an increase in capital inflows for, 60 
developing countries. Their results show that 13 percent of the changes in capital inflows was due to 
the effects of QE. However, they find that the influence of QE diminishes with each successive 
episode. This suggests that QE1 had a greater impact on capital inflows than subsequent QE 
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episodes. This is in contrast to Fratzcher et al. (2013:6), whose findings suggest that QE1 resulted in 
a sharp decline in inflows to EMEs, while QE2 increased the amount of inflows to EMEs.   
 
Although helpful in explaining the large swings in capital flows to EMEs, Fratzcher et al. (2013:6) 
find that QE had relatively small effects on capital flows when compared to other factors such as the 
speedy recovery of growth in EMEs. In particular, they find that US QE measures together explain 
only 5 and 6 percent of net equity inflows and net bond outflows in EMEs between mid-2007 and 
2011, respectively.  Fratzcher et al. (2013:6) therefore argue that it is possible that QE policies 
played a much bigger role in explaining the pattern of capital flows to EMEs than they did in 
accounting for the overall size of the flows. Nevertheless, they infer from their results that monetary 
policies in developed countries create a lot of externalities for financial markets in developing 
countries.  
 
Also examining the impact of QE on capital inflows to EMEs, Lim et al. (2014:13), like Burns et al. 
(2014), find that QE episodes increased the volume of gross capital inflows to 60 EMEs in addition 
to the increase observed through standard channels, such as interest rates. Lim et al. (2014:13) also 
find that of the total increase in gross inflows during the QE periods, 13 percent is attributable to QE. 
Moreover, just as in Burns et al. (2014), they also observe a diminishing effect of the respective QE 
episodes on gross capital inflows to developing countries. The size of the effect of the various QE 
episodes reduces from QE1 to QE2 and is actually insignificant for QE3.  
 
Park et al. (2014:5) also observe a similar pattern for 60 developing countries. They confirm the 
findings of Burns et al. (2014) and Lim et al. (2014) that the relative significance of the various QE 
episodes diminishes as you move from QE1 to QE3, suggesting that the first round of QE had a 
greater impact on capital flows than the other two episodes. They also confirm the findings of the 
other studies that capital inflows were especially large during the first round of QE.  
 
As alluded to in the previous section, a discussion on the relative importance of push and pull factors 
in explaining the pattern of capital flows to EMEs has taken centre stage in the capital flows 
literature. Burns et al. (2014:7) find that both push and pull factors are important determinants of 
capital flows to developing countries. They find, for example, that US interest rates, global risk and 
QE account for almost 60 percent of the growth in capital flows to EMEs. The remaining 40 percent 
is explained by factors such as developing countries’ sovereign credit ratings, growth and growth 
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differentials.  Lim et al. (2014:25) and Park et al. (2014:6) observe that, when decomposed into their 
constituent components, portfolio flows and in particular bond flows are more sensitive to “push” 
factors including QE. 
 
The final group of studies examine the impact of the withdrawal of accommodative monetary 
policies – QE tapering – in the West. There was growing concern that the tapering of QE would 
result in a sharp drop in capital inflows, resulting in several macroeconomic challenges (Lim et al., 
2014:3). Burns et al. (2014) and Lim et al. (2014) have studied this aspect of QE tapering quite 
extensively. For example, using a vector autoregressive (VAR) model, Lim et al. (2014:29) create a 
scenario in which QE normalises over three years (2014-2016); they assume in this scenario a 
gradual normalisation of long-term interest rates. Both Lim et al. (2014:29) and Burns et al. (2014:7) 
illustrate that capital inflows to developing countries reduced by between 10 to 12 percent over the 
three-year period. 
 
Park et al. (2014:11) use a slightly different approach to that of Burns et al. (2014) and Lim et al. 
(2014), to identify the impact of QE tapering. They investigate the effect of various country-specific 
factors on exchange rate depreciation. These include the current account deficit, real exchange rate 
appreciation, private capital inflows, GDP growth, inflation and domestic credit expansion, among 
many other things. However, their results reveal that only inflation led to exchange rate depreciation 
during QE tapering. While the effects of QE tapering are still very much debated in the literature, 
they are not the focus of this study.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In an attempt to stimulate growth, policy makers in the USA and other major developed countries 
responded by first employing standard monetary tools, notably policy rate cuts. However, disruptions 
in the financial markets and the effective zero limit of nominal interest rates weakened the usual 
channel of influence of nominal market rates. It was in light of this that they responded with 
unconventional monetary policies that are collectively called QE. QE, as it is commonly called, 
primarily took the form of large-scale purchases of financial assets, with the US Fed being the most 
active. 
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Although successful in bringing about an end to the recession in developed economies, successive 
rounds of QE are argued to have increased the amount of global liquidity and eventually capital 
inflows to emerging economies. The BRICS economies, having recovered fairly quickly from the 
global financial crisis, became the preferred destination for capital inflows.    
 
The transmission mechanism of QE to capital flows is argued to take place through the portfolio 
balance, liquidity and confidence channels. However, the impact of QE on capital flows through 
these channels has to be balanced against the standard drivers of capital flows, which are grouped 
into push and pull factors. As this chapter has shown, QE had effects on capital inflows to EMEs 
over and above those occurring through standard observable push and pull factors.  
 
Studies examining the impact of QE on capital inflows to EMEs have evolved from those that only 
modelled QE announcements of QE to those that modelled actual QE operations and finally to those 
that investigated the effect of QE tapering on capital flows. The key findings of event studies show 
that QE announcements alone are not sufficient to explain the impact of QE on capital inflows. The 
major studies that modelled actual QE operations reveal that QE had a sizeable impact on capital 
inflows. Finally, the studies examining the effects of QE tapering find that capital inflows to 
developing countries fell by close to 12 percent over 3 years. The next chapter sets out the 
methodological framework for analysing the effect of QE on capital flows to the BRICS countries. 
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Chapter 3  
Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 presented a summary of the theory and empirical work associated with the spillover effects 
of QE on EMEs’ capital flows. This chapter builds on this by discussing common approaches for 
estimating the impact of QE on capital flows to EMEs. Most studies have generally relied on event 
studies, dynamic panel fixed effects models and vector autoregressive models as discussed in Section 
3.2 of this chapter.  
 
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of the commonly used approaches in estimating the 
impact of QE. Section 3.2 gives a very brief overview of two of these approaches, namely event 
studies and vector autoregressive models. However, in order to demonstrate that the relevant 
literature has been reviewed and understood, detailed discussions of these two approaches are 
presented in Appendix A1 and A2. Most of Section 3.2 is dedicated to an in-depth discussion of the 
third approach – the dynamic panel data model – as it is the approach adopted for the analysis in this 
study.  
 
Section 3.3 complements this discussion by summarising the debates on aspects related to the 
modelling of capital flows, for example the choice between gross or net capital inflows. Section 3.4 
outlines the various model estimation techniques employed in the estimation of the effect of QE on 
capital flows to the BRICS. Section 3.5 provides a description of the data and variables employed in 
the study. Finally, Section 3.6 provides concluding remarks. 
 
3.2 Approaches to Estimating the Impact of Quantitative Easing 
 
The majority of studies related to QE in developed countries examine its impact on asset prices 
domestically or in other developed countries, very few have considered its impact on EMEs’ assets. 
Because QE is a relatively novel approach, there is still some division in the literature on the 
appropriate approaches for quantifying the spillover effects of QE on EMEs’ capital flows. A review 
of the literature reveals a tendency to use a mix of approaches in examining the spillover effects of 
QE.  
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Chapter 2 identified three categories of studies in the QE literature. The first includes those that 
model the impact of the Fed’s announcements on EMEs’ assets using event study methods, for 
example in Ghosh et al., (2012). This group of studies examines the spillover effects of QE within 
specified time windows around the Fed’s QE announcements. The second group of studies examines 
the behaviour of EME assets by regressing measures of net or gross capital flows on dummy 
variables for actual QE episodes and several push and pull factors (e.g. Khatiwada, 2017; Burns et 
al., 2014; Park et al., 2014; Ahmed & Zlate, 2013). These studies have relied on dynamic panel data 
methods. The third category of studies includes those that estimate the impact of QE within structural 
models that aim to assess the short-term spillover effects of QE on EMEs’ assets.  This section 
reviews these methods, devoting particular attention to their strengths and weaknesses.  
 
3.2.1 Event Studies and Vector Autoregressive Models 
 
A number of studies in the empirical literature have used event studies and vector autoregressive 
models (VARs) to investigate the spillover effects of QE. While event studies have been popularly 
used to investigate the behaviour of yields around the Fed’s announcements of QE, VARs have been 
used to examine the impact of monetary policy normalisation or “QE tapering”. Both approaches 
have their own strengths and short-comings.  
 
An event study is a tool used to examine the effect of an event or set of events on the value of a 
variable of interest (Nageswara Rao & Sreejith, 2014:40). Therefore, if the aim is to measure the 
impact of QE announcements on asset returns, an event study method is appropriate. Proponents of 
event studies base their arguments on their simplicity along with their ability to offer clarity on the 
impact of events. However, they have been criticised for example by Moore et al. (2013:6) who 
argue that an event such as the Fed’s announcement of QE can influence markets independent of the 
information contained in the statement. This could make a correct estimation of the impact of QE 
difficult. Even though more literature on event studies was reviewed, the length constraint of this 
thesis does not allow for it to be discussed here. A detailed discussion is attached in Appendix A1.  
 
While event studies are suitable for examining the influence of a QE announcement, they are not 
appropriate for capturing the short-term effects of actual QE operations. VARs are more suitable for 
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this purpose. VARs are models in which all variables are partly explained by their lagged value, and 
the current and lagged values of all other variables in the model. They have been especially criticised 
for being atheoretical as they are guided by very little economic theory. For the same reason as with 
event studies, a detailed discussion of VARs is not presented in this chapter, but in Appendix A2.   
 
The choice of which method to use usually depends on the nature of questions being investigated. 
Neither approach was found to be more useful for this study than the dynamic panel data model. It is 
discussed in detail in the section that follows.  
 
3.2.2 Dynamic Panel Models 
 
The availability of large macroeconomic datasets has led many macroeconomists to gain interest in 
estimating dynamic panel models (Judson & Owen, 1999:9). This is especially because most 
economic relationships are inherently dynamic (Hsiao & Tahmiscioglu, 2008:2699; Baltagi, 
2005:135). Dynamic models are those that account for the role time plays in the behaviour of 
variables; they allow researchers to better understand and explain the adjustment of variables over 
time (Baltagi, 2005:135).  
  
A dynamic panel model is by definition one that contains at least one lagged dependent variable as a 
regressor (Greene, 2003:307). The lagged variable is included to account for the persistent nature of 
most macroeconomic variables.  Capital flows in particular have exhibited strong levels of 
persistence in most empirical studies, suggesting a robust positive relationship with their own past 
values (Becker & Noone, 2008:167).  Lagged dependent variables of capital flows have been found 
to be highly significant in most model specifications (Lim et al., 2014:13). 
 
One fundamental advantage of dynamic panel models is their ability to model time-invariant 
differences among units (e.g. individuals, states or firms) described as unobserved heterogeneity or 
individual effects (Baltagi, 2005:135). These individual effects represent the influence of individual 
characteristics that are not included in the model but may be observed, for example race, location, 
sex, governance structures, and unobserved or hard to measure factors such as individual or country 
abilities or preferences that differ across individuals or countries, but remain constant over time 
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(Torres-Reyna, 2007:3; Greene, 2003:285;). Failure to capture such differences across countries may 
result in biased estimates.  
 
The treatment of unobserved heterogeneity in panel models has an implication for how a dynamic 
panel model is specified. Greene (2003:285) and Baltagi (2005:11) show, that when unobserved 
individual effects are assumed to be correlated or uncorrelated with the independent variables, the 
model is constructed as a fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE) model, respectively. The former 
is a suitable specification when the interest is on a particular group of countries and when inferences 
are restricted only to the countries observed (Baltagi, 2005:12). The latter on the other hand is 
suitable when dealing with a sample for which data have been randomly drawn from a large 
population (Greene, 2003:293).  
 
The introduction of a lagged dependent variable complicates estimation. In either the FE or RE 
settings the complication arises from the relationship between the individual effects and the lagged 
variable, a problem known as endogeneity (Flannery & Hankins, 2013:1; Hsiao, 2003:70). The 
residuals in majority of panel data applications have one component which is assumed to be the 
unobserved heterogeneity, and is fixed across time, and another component which is random, with 
zero mean and constant variance (Baltagi, 2005:11; Nickell, 1981:1417). Because the dependent 
variable is a function of these residuals, it follows that the lagged dependent variable will also 
correlate with the residuals (Baltagi, 2005:135). It is therefore not uncommon that unobserved 
differences among countries affect even the past values of the dependent variable.  
 
One major drawback of the dynamic FE model is that standard methods of estimation, for example,  
the ordinary least squares (OLS) and the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) are likely to be 
biased and inconsistent. The bias is estimated to be of order (1 𝑇⁄ ) and is assumed to reduce as the 
length of the panel T increases or tends to infinity (𝑇 → ∞). Judson and Owen (1999:10), for 
example, show that the LSDV approach performs better than alternative approaches when T is large 
(T>30).  However, when the time dimension is moderate, it does not perform better than other 
estimators. Still, Nickell (1981:1418) warns that biases may persist even when the number of time 
periods increases.   
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Notwithstanding this, econometric techniques have evolved to correct such biases. For example, the 
bias-corrected LSDV (LSDVC) estimator performs better for longer panels, although its applicability 
to unbalanced panels is limited and therefore alternatives may be required. An unbalanced panel 
arises when variables are not observed for all time periods for some countries (Ajmani, 2009:111). 
When the bias-corrected LSDV is not practical, the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) IV estimator or the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimators provide good alternatives (Judson & Owen, 1999:10). 
The most appropriate technique for estimating the parameters, however, depends on the 
characteristics of the data available (Judson & Owen, 1999:10). The general approach in many 
studies has been to test all the estimators and identify the appropriate one.  
 
Dynamic fixed effects models are a preferred method for investigating the behaviour of EMEs’ 
capital flows and have been applied in many studies (e.g. in Lim et al., 2014; Park et al., 2014; 
Ahmed & Zlate, 2013; Chinn, 2013; Fratzscher et al., 2013; IMF, 2013). The analysis of the spillover 
effects of QE on EMEs’ assets arguably requires the use of country FE to capture the influence of 
unobserved differences among countries. Ahmed and Zlate (2013:10) argue that fixed effects in a 
model examining the determinants of capital flows would capture, for example, the growth 
differentials between developing and developed economies, arising from differences in their long-
term growth potential.   
 
The LSDVC approach has emerged as the most popular estimator for establishing the impact of QE 
on cross-border capital flows in the studies most relevant to this one (e.g. Lim et al., 2014:9). The 
LSDVC estimator has also been applied to an unbalanced panel by Burns et al. (2014:38).  Park et al. 
(2014:5), apply the AB GMM estimation technique. The AH IV estimator has not been used in the 
recent literature on QE.  
 
Burn et al. (2014:5) argue that, although dynamic panel models are useful in explaining the long-
term effects of QE on capital inflows to EMEs, they are less suited for capturing the short-term 
effects of global market conditions on capital inflows. Recent literature (e.g. Dahlhaus & Vasishtha, 
2014; Lim et al., 2014) has given particular attention to the effects of US monetary policy 
normalisation on capital flows to EMEs. These studies have modelled the ‘policy normalisation 
shock’ using VAR models which, according to Burns et al. (2014:5), are more suited to capturing the 
short-term dynamics of capital inflows in response to such a shock.  
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3.2.3 Concluding Remarks on Estimation Techniques 
 
This study uses the dynamic fixed effects model, as it has been widely applied in similar studies. 
While event study methods offer insights into the behaviour of assets around the time that QE was 
implemented, they are unable to give a long-term perspective on the effect of QE on capital flows to 
the BRICS. Moreover, while VARs are ideal for estimating the effects of QE tapering in the USA on 
capital flows to EMEs, this study’s aim is to identify whether there were any unobservable effects of 
QE in addition to those channelled through the observables, and whether these effects were different 
for different types of capital flows. 
 
3.3 Methodological Debates in the Capital Flows Literature 
 
Whether researchers decide to use panel data techniques or VAR methods, they are faced with other 
considerations which have been a source of significant debate in the capital flows literature. A 
fundamental debate confronting the capital flows literature is the choice between modelling gross or 
net inflows, and whether focusing on either one separately makes any difference to the results. The 
definitions of gross and net flows were provided in Chapter 2. Ahmed and Zlate (2013:5) argue that 
the decision to focus on either gross inflows or net inflows appears to depend on the nature of the 
questions of interest.  
 
As De Gregorio (2012:1) points out, the use of gross versus net inflows has different implications for 
macroeconomic stability and financial stability. He notes that while the analyses of exchange rate 
pressures are associated with net inflows, issues of financial stability are much more associated with 
gross inflows. Similarly, Bluedorn et al. (2013:5) note that while net inflows are key determinants of 
the exchange rate, gross inflows are key determinants of financial asset prices, which affect financial 
stability. Therefore it would appear that modelling net capital inflows is more appropriate when 
exchange rate appreciation and overheating are a concern, while gross inflows are more suited for 
addressing financial stability concerns (Ahmed & Zlate, 2013:9).  
 
Moreover, according to Forbes and Warnock (2012:236) the distinction between net and gross 
inflows is substantial, especially in light of the increase in the size and instability of gross flows 
compared to net flows, post the GFC. Because gross outflows and inflows each respond to distinct 
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factors, Forbes and Warnock (2012:236) argue that an analysis based only on net inflows is likely to 
underrepresent the dramatic changes of the last ten or so years and overlook important information 
contained in gross flows.  
 
Furthermore, Bluedorn et al. (2013:4) observe discrepancies in the behaviour of gross and net 
inflows between emerging economies and advanced economies. For emerging economies, they note 
that net and gross inflows tend to move in the same direction – an increase in gross inflows translates 
in an increase in net inflows. This is mainly because gross outflows in emerging economies are not 
significant enough to counter the growth in gross inflows. Thus, the increase or decrease in net 
inflows in emerging economies is largely driven by foreign investors (Ghosh et al., 2012:3). 
Advanced economies, however, present a different picture. Net inflows in advanced economies have 
remained relatively stable despite large movements in gross inflows. This is because gross outflows 
in advanced economies are large enough to offset the large movements in gross inflows, such that net 
inflows do not always move in tandem with gross inflows. Because gross inflows are the main 
drivers of net inflows in EMEs, this thesis focuses on the behaviour of gross inflows in the BRICS 
economies.  
 
Another prominent issue in the literature is the way that capital flows are categorised. The IMF, for 
example, identifies five categories of capital flows, while the Institute for International Finance (IIF) 
identifies only four categories. The IMF (2009:121) classifies “capital flows into: foreign direct 
investment (FDI); portfolio investments (both bonds and equity); financial derivatives and employee 
stock options (ESOs); reserve assets; and other investments”.  “The ‘other investments’ category is 
comprised of international loans and deposits, banking capital, trade credits and official government 
flows” (Bluedorn et al., 2013:8). In contrast, the Institute of International Finance (IIF) classifies 
capital flows into FDI, portfolio equity and debt and other investment flows consisting of commercial 
bank and non-bank lending, official flows and reserves Koepe (2013:7).  
 
The IMF classification has been widely used in the empirical literature.  However the measurement 
of capital flows in the various studies is subject to the type of questions asked. For example, Burns et 
al. (2014:34) calculate capital inflows as the sum of FDI, portfolio debt and equity, financial 
derivatives plus bank lending. In contrast, Lim et al. (2014:10) in their measurement of capital flows 
focus only on direct investment flows and portfolio flows. Others like Bluedorn et al. (2013:8) 
include all the five functional categories in their calculation of capital flows. In some cases, the 
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categories employed in the calculation of capital flows will depend on the availability of data for the 
respective categories.  
 
In addition, the literature distinguishes between private capital and official flows. Flows to the 
government and monetary authorities are designated as official flows. This study, like most others 
(e.g. Burns et al., 2014:5), excludes official flows from the analysis, as they respond to an entirely 
different set of factors. The focus is on the behaviour of private flows, defined as capital flows 
received by the private sector. Moreover, lending originating from multilateral and bilateral 
institutions is excluded. The accumulation of reserves is also excluded from this calculation.  
 
This paper focuses on the behaviour of gross private capital inflows as defined by the IMF. The 
sources of gross capital inflows and the way they are measured are discussed in the following 
sections of this chapter.  
 
3.4 Model Estimation Techniques 
 
This study adopts the dynamic fixed effects model to address the objectives outlined in Chapter 1. 
This section therefore presents the issues related to panel data analysis. Section 3.4.1 outlines the 
basic panel data model and its key characteristics and their implications on econometric modelling 
and analysis. Section 3.4.2 outlines methods for establishing stationarity or non-stationarity in panel 
data. The choice between including RE or FE in the model is discussed in Section 3.4.3.  The 
diagnostic tests required to ascertain the adequacy of the model specified in Chapter 4, are given in 
Section 3.4.4. These include the tests for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.   
 
3.4.1 The Basic Panel Data Regression Model 
 
Panel or longitudinal data are those in which the behaviour of several entities (e.g. individuals, firms, 
or countries) is observed over a period of time (Greene 2003:283; Hsiao 2003:1). This type of data is 
described using two elements – the number of units (cross sections) and the number of time periods. 
Katchova (2013:4) distinguishes between three types of panels: short panels with many individuals 
and few time periods; long panels with few individuals and many time periods; and panels with many 
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individuals and many time periods. This characterisation of panel data is important when choosing an 
appropriate estimation technique, as will be shown in Chapter 4.  
 
The model described in Equation 3.1. below, differs from other econometric models because it has 
double subscripts on its variables. 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents the observation for the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ individual at time 𝑡, 
where 𝑁 is the number of units and 𝑇 is the number of periods. However, 𝑇 may vary for each 
individual resulting in what is known as an unbalanced panel (Ajmani, 2009:111). The term 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the 
𝑖𝑡ℎ observation on K independent variables, and includes observations variables that may influence 
the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡; 𝛼 is a scalar, while 𝛽 represents the vector of parameters of interest; 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
represents the disturbances.  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,                   𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇                                                                        3.1 
 
The disturbances 𝑢𝑖𝑡, can be described as either a one-way error (𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡) or a two-way error 
(𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡) component model. In both specifications 𝜇𝑖 is assumed to contain a constant 
term and unobserved individual-specific characteristics that do not change over time but differ across 
individuals, hence the term FE (Greene, 2003:28; Ajmani, 2009:111). In the context of this study 
individual effects may include any permanent differences among the BRICS countries that are more 
or less constant over time, but have an influence on capital inflows. Ahmed and Zlate (2013:10) give 
an example of growth differentials of each EME relative to advanced economies that arise from their 
long-term differences in each country’s growth potential.  
 
The second term 𝜆𝑡 denotes the unobservable time effect.  According to Baltagi (2005:33), the time 
effect does not vary across individuals and it captures time-specific effects excluded from the model. 
Ahmed and Zlate (2013:19) suggest that this could include, for example, any dampening effect of 
capital controls on capital after the GFC. The remainder disturbances are denoted by 𝑣𝑖𝑡 and are 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed (IID) with zero mean and constant variance 
[𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷 (0, 𝜎𝜀
2)]. The disturbances (error terms) of Equation 3.1 are the basis of many tests aimed at 
examining the behaviour of the model, as will be seen in subsequent sections of this chapter.  
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3.4.2 Stationarity and Non-Stationarity in Panel Data 
 
Detecting stationarity is critical for any econometric analysis, because the stationarity or otherwise of 
data can strongly influence its properties (Brooks, 2008:207). A stationary process is one that has 
constant mean and variance, and a constant autocovariance structure for each lag3 (Brooks, 
2008:208). In other words, data are stationary if their mean, variance and autocovariance remain 
constant over time. When data exhibits such properties it is called a weakly stationary process. Weak 
stationarity implies that any shock to a series should be temporary such that with time the shock dies 
out and the series converges to its long-run equilibrium (Gujarati, 2004:798). Stationary series are 
particularly important if econometric findings are to be generalised to other time periods.  
 
Even though most econometric analyses emphasise the need for stationary processes, most series are 
rarely stationary. In contrast to stationary series, non-stationary series tend to deviate from their mean 
and exhibit increasing variance as the sample size increases. The tendency of non-stationary data to 
diverge from their mean makes their use less appropriate for forecasting. According to Brooks 
(2008:319), the use of non-stationary data in economic regressions can result in spurious results – 
results that look good as defined by the coefficient estimates and fit of the model, but which are 
really valueless. Vinh and Fuhita (2007:11) note that most macroeconomic and financial data are 
usually non-stationary.  
 
The most commonly used models for characterising non-stationarity include the random walk model 
(RWM) without drift and the RWM with drift. The former is an example of a difference stationary 
process (DSP), because it can be converted into a stationary process by taking its first difference 
(FD) (Gujarati, 2004:803). A series is integrated of order d [I(d)], if it has to be differenced d times to 
become stationary (Gujarati, 2004:805). An RWM with drift is also known as an RWM with trend 
because it is stationary around a linear trend (Brooks, 2008:321). When the trend is stochastic 
(random), an RWM with drift is a DSP because it becomes stationary after differencing it once. 
However, when the trend is deterministic, Gujarati (2004:803) shows that such a series can be 
transformed into a stationary process through a procedure known as detrending.  
 
                                                   
3
 Autocovariance determines how a variable y is related to its previous values. The autocovariance is described in 
terms of the distance between two time periods and not the time at which it is computed (Gujarati, 2004:797). 
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The RWM is likened to a unit root process – therefore non-stationarity, random walk and unit root 
are used interchangeably (Gujarati, 2004:801). While it is a dominant practice in time series 
modelling, testing for unit roots in panel data is fairly new (Im, Pesaran & Shin, 2003; Levin, Lin & 
Chu, 2002). Even though most of the time series unit root tests now apply to panel data analysis, the 
asymptotic behaviour of both N and T is critical in panel unit root tests (Baltagi, 2008:239).  
 
The way in which N and T converge to infinity is critical when selecting the type of unit root test to 
use. Baltagi (2008:239) lists three main approaches for categorising the asymptotic behaviour of N 
and T. The first approach known as the sequential limit theory fixes one dimension, say N, and 
allows T to increase to infinity, thereby providing a intermediate limit. Starting from this 
intermediate limit, N is allowed to grow large. The second approach – the diagonal path limit theory 
– allows both N and T to increase, according to a specified diagonal path. The third and final 
approach, the joint limit theory, also lets both N and T to increase but at the same time. The joint 
limit theory has been identified as a more robust approach than either of the other two (Phillips & 
Moon, 2000:1064).  
   
There are several methods for detecting unit roots in panel data and each test makes different 
asymptotic assumptions about N and T. Monte Carlo experiments by Hlouskova and Wagner 
(2005:5) reveal that the relative size of the panel has an important bearing on the performance of the 
respective tests. This study will discuss only three of the most commonly used approaches: the 
Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) test, the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test and the Fisher-type Test based on the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. However, these tests not applicable when there is cross-
sectional correlation4 (Baltagi, 2008:241).  
 
3.4.2.1 Levin-Lin-Chu Test 
  
The LLC test is among the few tests that apply the joint limit theory subject to certain restrictions 
(Levin, Lin & Chu, 2002:3). Unlike in time series unit root tests, the LLC test allows both fixed and 
time effects in the data-generating process (Maddala & Wu, 1999:632). The LLC test strongly 
assumes that autocorrelation given by the autoregressive parameter 𝜌 is uniform across all cross-
sectional units. Hlouskova and Wagner (2005:7) argue that this assumption does not allow for the 
                                                   
4
 In the context of this study, this implies that capital inflows to Brazil are uncorrelated with capital inflows to 
China.  
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possibility that some cross-sectional units may contain unit roots while others may not. This 
assumption is made because the unit root test statistic is derived from a pooled regression as shown 
in Equation 3.2 below:  
 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝐿Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝐿
𝑝𝑖
𝐿=1
+ 𝜇𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                           3.2  
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable; 𝜌𝑖 is the autoregressive parameter for each individual – it 
represents the coefficient on the first-order lag of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 – and it is assumed to be identical for all 
individuals. The term 𝑑𝑖𝑡 represents the deterministic components (fixed effects or time effects) and 
𝜇𝑖 the corresponding coefficients. 𝜃𝑖𝐿 is the vector of coefficients for the higher-order lags of 𝑦𝑖𝑡. 𝑝𝑖 
is the lag order and is allowed to differ across N.  
 
The LLC test tests the null hypothesis (𝐻0) that each series has a unit root (𝐻0: 𝜌𝑖 = 0 where 
𝑖 = 1 … . . , 𝑁), against the alternative hypothesis (𝐻1) that the series is stationary (𝐻1: 𝜌𝑖 < 0 where 
𝑖 = 1 … . . , 𝑁). Levin et al. (2002:5) outline three key steps. In step 1 Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) regressions are run to derive two orthogonalised residuals. The residuals are then used in step 
2 to derive the standard deviations for every single N. The pooled t-statistics are then generated in the 
third step.  
 
A statistically significant t-statistic results in the rejection of 𝐻0 suggesting that a series is stationary. 
As both T and N grow to infinity, the LLC t-statistic has a limiting normal distribution (Levin et al., 
2002:18). However, in order for the LLC test to be successful, T should grow faster than N such that 
the ratio of N to T tends to zero (𝑁𝑇 𝑇⁄ → 0) (Baltagi, 2008:241). Because of this, the LLC is not 
suitable for datasets that have a large N and relatively small T. According to Levin et al. (2002:3), the 
test performs well for macro panels where N and T are in the range 10-250 and 25-250, respectively. 
When T is very large, the authors suggest running individual unit root time series tests on each cross-
sectional unit, because the gains from aggregating are likely to be small.  
 
The LLC test is not without its limitations. Firstly, the test has been criticised for relying heavily on 
the independence assumption across N and is thus impractical when cross-sectional correlation is 
present (Baltagi, 2008:242). However, it is possible in some cases to remove cross-sectional 
46 
 
autocorrelation by subtracting the averages across individuals. Secondly, the assumption that 
individuals have uniform first-order autoregressive coefficients is also somewhat restrictive. Thirdly, 
and more importantly for this study, the LLC test requires that the panel be strongly balanced, 
rendering it inappropriate for this study.  
 
3.4.2.2 Im-Pesaran-Shin Test 
 
The Im-Pesaran-Shin test (henceforth IPS test) unlike the LLC test allows for heterogeneous first-
order autoregressive parameters (𝜌) among cross-sections (Baltagi, 2008:242). Like the LLC test, the 
IPS test also allows for serial correlation among the disturbances and different error variances across 
individual units (Im, Pesaran & Shin, 2003:54). It applies both the sequential limit theory and the 
diagonal limit theory.  
 
The IPS test, like the LLC test, also tests the 𝐻0 that each series contains a unit root. However, 𝐻1 
allows some, but not all, of the cross-sections to have unit roots. Though, as Baltagi (2008:242) 
shows, the individual series that are stationary need to be non-zero if the IPS test is to be consistent. 
While the IPS test is applicable to unbalanced panel data, it requires that there be no gaps in each 
series.  
 
The IPS test also proceeds by running separate ADF regressions for each individual unit using 
Equation 3.2 above. As Maddala and Wu (1999:635) show, the same lag length should be applied to 
each ADF regression. The final test statistic, called the t-bar, is computed as the mean of individual 
test statistics (Im, Pesaran & Shin, 2003:53). Commenting on the interpretation of the test results, Im 
et al. (2003:73) caution that the rejection of 𝐻0 does not imply rejection for all units. It is rejected 
only for 𝑁1 < 𝑁, individuals. A significant drawback of the IPS approach is that it does not point to 
the specific individuals for which the 𝐻0 is rejected.  
 
Monte Carlo simulations reveal that the IPS test performs well even for T=10 in the absence of serial 
correlation. However, when the disturbances are serially correlated, both N and T have to be 
adequately large (Im et al., 2003:73). Baltagi (2008:243) notes that the likelihood of rejecting the 𝐻0 
when it is true, increases when N is either small or large relative to T (Baltagi, 2008:243). However, 
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the IPS test outperforms the LLC test when the panel is small, even in the presence of serial 
correlation and heterogeneity.  
 
3.4.2.3 The Fisher-type Test 
 
Like the IPS test, the Fisher test also relaxes the assumption that 𝜌𝑖 is identical for all cross-sectional 
units. According to Maddala and Wu (1999:637), both tests combine information from individual 
ADF tests to construct the unit root test statistic. The two tests are also comparable in that they have 
similar null and alternative hypotheses. However, they differ in the way they establish the presence 
of unit roots. The Fisher test, like the IPS test, does not require the data to be strongly balanced. 
Moreover, the Fisher test, is not restricted to the ADF test, it can apply any time series unit root test. 
  
The Fisher-type test uses the p-values from the ADF regressions to construct a test for unit roots 
(Baltagi, 2008:244). The resulting test statistic follows the chi-square (𝜒2) distribution with 2N 
degrees of freedom (Maddala & Wu, 1999:636). Monte Carlo simulations by Maddala and Wu 
(1999:639) reveal that the Fisher test outperforms the IPS test for high values of T (50 or 100) and N 
(50 or 100). The Fisher test presents fewer distortions than the LLC and IPS tests in the presence of 
both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (Maddala & Wu, 1999:644). The Monte Carlo tests by 
Maddala and Wu (1999:645) conclude generally that the Fisher test is simpler and outperforms the 
IPS and LLC tests.  However, it has the disadvantage that the p-values have to be computed from 
simulations.  
 
This study uses both the IPS and Fisher tests to detect unit roots. The main rationale for choosing 
these two approaches is that they are both tailored to accommodate unbalanced panel data, making 
them appropriate for this study. In addition, both tests allow for heterogeneity and serial correlation 
in the error terms which usually occur in most empirical work. Moreover, the two tests can account 
for individual-specific effects (fixed effects), which again makes them appropriate for this study, as 
the model described in Chapter 4 includes fixed effects.   
 
 
 
48 
 
3.4.3 Fixed Effects and Random Effects Models 
 
The specific choice of model for analysing panel data depends on the treatment of unobserved 
individual effects (Ajmani, 2009:111). When 𝜇𝑖 are assumed to be constant across individual units 
such that 𝜇1 = 𝜇2 = ⋯ = 𝜇𝑛 = 𝜇, the model parameters can be computed using OLS. This type of 
estimation results in a pooled regression model represented by Equation 3.3 (Ajmani, 2009:111).  It 
is the most restrictive and least used panel data model as it does not account for unobserved 
differences that exist in panel data.  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                             3.3     
                                                                         
However, when the assumption that 𝜇1 = 𝜇2 = ⋯ = 𝜇𝑛 = 𝜇 is relaxed, OLS estimation can no 
longer produce consistent and efficient estimates (Greene, 2003:284). When this assumption no 
longer holds, researchers opt to run what are called FE or RE models. Unlike the pooled OLS model, 
these two models allow for differences across units and include individual-specific time-invariant 
effects 𝜇𝑖. However, the two models differ in their assumptions. When the unobserved individual 
effects are assumed to be correlated with the observed regressors in the model, the appropriate model 
to use is the FE model depicted in Equation 3.4 (Ajmani, 2009:113).  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                            3.4 
 
The term “fixed effects” is used to refer to the fact that while 𝜇𝑖 may differ for each country, they do 
not vary over time (Torres-Reyna 2007:9; Greene 2004:642). The FE model captures the unobserved 
individual effects as differences in the constant term, resulting in different intercept terms μi to be 
estimated for each entity (Greene, 2003:287). Indeed the FE model is practical when differences 
between entities can be seen as parametric shifts of the regression. According to Ajmani (2009:123) 
and Baltagi (2005:12), the interpretations from the FE analysis should be applied only to the 
countries selected for the study.   
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FE models can be estimated using three main methods: the LSDV approach, the within-group and 
between-group effects approaches. The LSDV5 model, also known as the covariance model, captures 
the unobserved individual effects by including dummy variables for each entity in the regression 
function (Ajmani, 2009:113; Torres-Reyna, 2007:17). The inclusion of dummy variables ensures that 
only the pure effect of the regressors on the regressand is estimated.  
 
Although easy to apply, the LSDV model is not without problems. First, Baltagi (2005:13) shows 
that substantial degrees of freedom are lost as the number of entities N increases, since (N-1) extra 
parameters need to be estimated. Therefore, this approach may not be feasible for very large panels. 
Nevertheless, if N is small enough and T large enough, the LSDV model can produce consistent and 
efficient estimates using OLS estimation (Baltagi, 2005:13; Greene, 2003:287). Second, the inclusion 
of many dummy variables may worsen the problem of multicollinearity among the explanatory 
variables, making precise estimation of parameters difficult (Greene, 2004:646). Third, the LSDV 
model does not identify the effect of time-invariant variables such as geographical location, 
institutional and cultural characteristics.   
 
Unlike the LSDV model, the within-group effects model considers the variation within each entity in 
the panel by using the individual-specific deviations of variables from their time-averaged values 
(Katchova, 2013:12). Despite this, the within-groups estimator still produces identical coefficients to 
the LSDV model on the non-dummy variables. One limitation of this model, however, is that it drops 
the individual-specific effects and their coefficients are therefore not identified (Ajmani, 2009:113). 
An advantage of the within-group effects approach is that it produces consistent estimates despite the 
correlation between unobserved individual effects and the regressors (Ajmani, 2009:13).  
 
The between-group effects model, on the other hand, only considers the variation across entities in a 
panel. This model produces non-dummy coefficients that are different from the other two models. It 
relates the mean of the dependent variable to the means of the regressors and an overall constant 
individual effect (Ajmani, 2009:113). A major limitation of this type of estimation is that by 
averaging the observations, the number of observations collapses to N. Ajmani (2009:113) argues 
that fewer observations significantly reduce the degrees of freedom, especially when the regressors 
are many.  
                                                   
5
 Greene (2003:287) points out that the “least squares” part of the name refers to the technique used to estimate the 
model, and not the model itself. 
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In contrast to the FE model, the RE model assumes that 𝜇𝑖 are distributed independently of the 
observed regressors and are therefore not correlated with the regressors (Ajmani, 2009:111). 
According to Baltagi (2005:14), the RE model is an appropriate specification when the countries 
included in the model are drawn randomly from a large population. Therefore, the interpretations 
from the RE model can be generalised to the larger population. Torres-Reyna (2007:25) further 
argues that the RE model should be used when there is a possibility that differences across 
individuals have some influence on the dependent variable. Unlike the FE model, the RE model 
requires that these individual-specific characteristics be specified in the model. However, this 
becomes restrictive as some variables may not be observed, resulting in the omitted variable bias.  
 
In the case of the RE model, the unobserved heterogeneity is divided into two components: a 
component (𝜇) that is fixed and the same for all countries, and a random disturbance (𝑢𝑖) that is 
specific to each of the individual units being studied (Ajmani, 2009:111). This results in the 
formulation represented in Equation 3.5. The disturbances ui and εit are assumed to be IID (0, 𝜎𝑢
2). 
The main premise of the RE model is that any differences across entities that are not captured in the 
observed regressors are reflected in the disturbances 𝑢𝑖 (Greene, 2004:647). If the RE model is the 
true model, the estimators are consistent and efficient.  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                    3.5 
 
The most appropriate method for estimating the RE model is the generalised least squares (GLS) 
method. Greene (2004:649) notes that even though the GLS method is difficult to implement, it has 
now been incorporated into a number of modern statistical software packages that allow for 
estimation of the RE model. As a result, this section does not describe the specific mathematics 
related to this method. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the RE model will be implemented for this 
study, for reasons discussed above.  
 
An inevitable challenge facing many researchers using panel data is whether to include FE or RE in 
their model. From the preceding explanation, it is clear that this depends on whether one assumes 
that the unobserved individual-effects correlate with any of the regressors, or not (Greene, 2004:650). 
Formal tests have been devised that guide the decision to adopt either the FE or RE model.  
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The Hausman specification test is the most commonly used approach for determining whether the FE 
or RE model is more appropriate. It tests whether there is a significant difference between the FE 
model and the RE model. According to Ajmani (2009:128), the Hausman specification test tests the 
𝐻0 that the unobserved individual-specific effects and the observed regressors are uncorrelated (strict 
exogeneity) against the 𝐻1 that they are correlated (strict endogeneity).  
 
Under the 𝐻0, both the FE estimator (?̂?𝐹𝐸) and the RE estimator (?̂?𝑅𝐸) are consistent estimators for 
the parameter β, but the FE estimator is inefficient (Greene, 2003:301). However, under the 𝐻1, only 
the FE estimator is consistent for β. A significant difference between the RE and FE estimators leads 
to the rejection of the null hypothesis, which is taken to mean that the FE model is the appropriate 
one.   
 
Formally, the Hausman specification test tests the following hypotheses: 
 
𝐻0: 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑖, 𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 0, RE model is the correct model 
 
𝐻1: 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑖, 𝑋𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0, FE model is the correct model 
 
The Hausman’s test statistic is based on the Wald criterion and is given by: 
 
𝐻 = (?̂?𝐹𝐸 − ?̂?𝑅𝐸)
𝑇
(𝑉𝑎𝑟?̂?𝐹𝐸 − 𝑉𝑎𝑟?̂?𝑅𝐸)
−1
(?̂?𝐹𝐸 − ?̂?𝑅𝐸) ~ 𝜒
2(𝑘)                                                             3.6 
 
?̂?𝐹𝐸 – FE estimator, 
?̂?𝑅𝐸 – RE estimator, 
Varβ̂FE – variance of the FE model; and 
𝑉𝑎𝑟?̂?𝑅𝐸 – variance of the RE model.  
 
While the results of the Hausman specification test are important in guiding the decision between the 
FE or RE models, ultimately the model selected will be guided by theory and empirical evidence. As 
alluded to earlier, several studies similar to this one, for example, Burns et al. (2014) and Lim et al. 
(2014), use the fixed effects model. They argue that the analysis of the effect of QE on capital flows 
to EMEs requires the use of FE to account for unobserved differences among countries. 
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Panel data regression models regardless of whether they include FE or RE can be extended to include 
a lagged dependent variable, resulting in what are known as dynamic panel models. Chapter 4 
provides more information on dynamic panel models and the methods used to estimate them. 
However, even in the case of a dynamic panel model, a choice still has to be made between 
modelling FE or RE.  
 
3.4.4 Model Adequacy Tests 
 
Once the decision to use either the FE or RE model has been made, there are other concerns that a 
researcher must address to ascertain the adequacy of the chosen model. This can be achieved through 
the use of diagnostic tests or checks. As Zeileis and Hothorn (2002:1) point out, the purpose of these 
diagnostic tests is not to ascertain whether the model is wrong, but rather to determine how serious 
any irregularities are. Some of the most common diagnostic tests in applied econometrics are tests for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. These tests are often related to the behaviour of residuals of 
the estimated model. Examining the behaviour of residuals makes it possible to ascertain the 
appropriateness of a model. Consequently, a well-specified model is defined as one which exhibits 
well-behaved residuals that are normally distributed, serially uncorrelated and have homoscedastic 
residuals (Dlamini, 2008:60).  
 
3.4.4.1 Testing for Heteroscedasticity in Panel Data 
 
The standard ECM described in Equation 3.1 assumes that the regression error terms are 
homoscedastic with constant variance across time and individuals. However, Baltagi (2008:79) 
argues that an assumption such as this one may be very restrictive, especially in the case where 
individuals or countries or cross-sections may vary in size and hence exhibit diversity. Hsiao 
(2003:56) shows that in the ECMs heteroscedasticity can occur because the variance of the 
unobserved individual-specific effects 𝜇𝑖 varies with each individual country 𝑖 in the panel. Baum 
(2001:101) also argues that while error terms may be homoscedastic within cross-sectional units, 
their variance may vary across individual.  
 
Baltagi (2008:79) notes that while assuming that the error terms are homoscedastic when they are 
not, does not necessarily result in inconsistent estimates of the regression parameters; it results in 
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inefficient estimates and biased standard errors. Because of this, it becomes necessary to check the 
error terms for heteroscedasticity. The Wald Statistic for groupwise heteroscedasticity is an example 
of a test that can be used to check for heteroscedasticity in the residuals of an FE regression model. 
This test tests the 𝐻0 of homoscedasticity (𝜎𝑖
2 = 𝜎2 for i=1, …. N) against the 𝐻1 of 
heteroscedasticity (Baum, 2001:101); 𝜎𝑖
2 denotes the cross-sectional unit’s error variance for 
individual i. The Wald test statistic is defined as: 
 
𝑊 = ∑
(?̂?𝑖
2 − ?̂?2)2
𝑉𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                                                                                                           3.7 
 
The Wald test statistic is distributed as 𝜒2(N) under the 𝐻0. Simulations conducted by Baum (2001) 
reveal that the Wald test statistic performs poorly for panels with large N and small T. This is 
unlikely to be a problem in this study as T is significantly larger than N. This test statistic is also 
applicable to unbalanced panels. When the error terms are found to be heteroscedastic, a simple 
solution is to derive robust standard errors to correct for the heteroscedasticity (Baltagi, 2008:79).  
 
3.4.4.2 Testing for Serial Correlation in Panel Data 
 
In addition to assuming that the disturbances are homoscedastic, standard panel data models also 
assume that the residuals are serially uncorrelated, conditional on 𝜇𝑖. According to Wooldridge 
(2002:176), the presence of serial correlation in the residuals implies that the errors in every time 
period contain a time-invariant omitted factor. The presence of serial correlation results in biased 
standard errors and less efficient regression estimates (Drukker, 2003:168). As a result of this, it 
becomes imperative to dictate serial correlation in the residuals.  
 
This study uses the test proposed by Wooldridge (2002) to identify serial correlation in the error 
terms. Drukker (2003:168) finds this test to be more robust than other panel data serial correlation 
tests as it has fewer assumptions. Wooldridge’s test is based on the first difference of the one-way 
ECM described in Equation 3.1, which assumes that there is no serial correlation among the 
disturbances. The test is therefore based on Equation 3.8 below.  
 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡 + Δ𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                             3.8 
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Wooldridge’s test proceeds by obtaining the residuals ?̂?𝑖𝑡6 from the regression described in Equation 
3.7 above. Wooldridge assumes that if the disturbances are not serially correlated, then the 
correlation between them in time period t and its first-order lag equals -0.5 [Corr (Δ𝑢𝑖𝑡, Δ𝑢𝑖𝑡−1) = -
0.5]. Based on this assumption, the test regresses the first-differenced variables on their lags and tries 
to establish if the coefficient on these variables is equal to -0.5. Alternatively, one may conduct a t 
test on the coefficient on the lagged residuals. A statistically significant coefficient on the lagged 
residuals results in the rejection of the 𝐻0 of no serial correlation.  
 
Most empirical analyses using panel data found serially correlated error terms. Hsiao (2003:57) notes 
that several cases exist where the effects of unobserved variables vary systematically over time and 
are therefore not well described by disturbances that are assumed to be constant over time. Therefore, 
Hsiao (2003:57) argues that it is more realistic to relax the assumption of no serial correlation. 
Nevertheless, a number of statistical packages have evolved to include techniques that correct for 
serial correlation.  
 
3.5 Application of the Dynamic Panel Model  
 
The preceding sections discussed the various approaches previously used in estimating the impact of 
QE on capital flows as well as the various estimation techniques related to panel data. In keeping 
with the objectives of this study, this section presents and describes the econometric model employed 
in estimating the effect of QE on the BRICS’ capital inflows. This study adopts the dynamic panel 
model, described in Section 3.5.1 below. This modelling approach follows closely the one employed 
in Ahmed and Zlate (2013), Burns et al. (2014) and Lim et al. (2014).  
 
Section 3.5.1 also describes the complication arising from the addition of a lagged dependent 
variable as a regressor, and documents some of the estimation techniques available for circumventing 
this complication. The lagged dependent variable introduces endogeneity into the model, rendering 
standard panel data estimates such as the LSDV biased and inconsistent. Several IV and GMM 
estimators have been developed to fit dynamic panel data models. This Section provides a summary 
of the most commonly used estimation techniques. These include:  the AH IV estimator; the AB and 
                                                   
6
 Residuals are the difference between the observed and predicted values of the dependent variable (Gujarati, 
2004:59).  
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BB GMM estimators; and the LSDVC estimator (Kiviet, 1995). The study employs the dynamic 
panel data (DPD) estimator that fits dynamic panel models using the AB and BB estimators.  
 
3.5.1 Dynamic Panel Model with a Lagged Dependent Variable 
 
This study uses a dynamic panel model with FE, to examine the effect of QE on capital inflows to the 
BRICS economies. The formal representation of this model (Equation 3.9) is similar to the static 
model described in Equation 3.1, except that it contains a lagged dependent variable (𝑦𝑖𝑡−1) as an 
independent variable, as shown below: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                          𝑖 = 1, … . 𝑛; 𝑡 = 1, … . , 𝑇                                                             3.9 
 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the set of independent variables, 𝛾 and 𝛽 are parameters to 
be estimated. The absolute value of the autoregressive parameter (𝛾) is assumed to be less than one 
(|𝛾| < 1). The disturbance term 𝑢𝑖𝑡 denotes the two-way error components disturbances as shown in 
Equation 3.10. The terms 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜆𝑡 represent the unobserved individual and time specific effects, 
respectively. Equation 3.10 demonstrates that 𝜇𝑖 remains the same for a given unit over time t, while 
𝜆𝑡 is the same for a given time over individuals i. The remainder disturbances 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are assumed to be 
IID [𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷 (0, 𝜎𝜀
2)], with no correlation among the residuals (𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡𝜀𝑗𝑠) = 0).  
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                       𝑖 = 1, … . 𝑛; 𝑡 = 1, … . , 𝑇                                                          3.10 
 
Equation 3.9 can be constructed as either an FE model or an RE model depending on the assumptions 
made about the relationship between 𝜇𝑖 and 𝑋𝑖𝑡. When 𝜇𝑖 are assumed to be correlated with 𝑋𝑖𝑡, the 
model is constructed as an FE model, while no correlation between the two results in the construction 
of an RE model (Hsiao, 2003:49). Whether it is an FE or RE dynamic panel model, the model 
described above (Equation 3.9) indicates that any influence that the independent explanatory 
variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 have on the outcome variable is now conditioned on the history of the dependent 
variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 (Greene, 2003:307).  
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3.5.1.1 Complications in Estimating the Dynamic Panel Model 
 
Whether in the fixed or random effects settings, the relationship between 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝜇𝑖, results in 
complications when estimating dynamic panel models (Hsiao, 2003:70; Flannery & Hankins, 
2013:1). According to Greene (2003:307), the presence of both 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝜇𝑖, violates the assumption 
of strict exogeneity of the independent variables. The endogeneity introduced by 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 renders 
standard panel data estimates biased (Nickell, 1981:1418).  
 
For example, Hsiao (2003:70) notes that the LSDV model (see Section 3.2.2) under the FE 
formulation no longer produces consistent estimators, particularly for large panels covering a small 
number of periods. This bias has been estimated to be of order (1/T) and is assumed to reduce as T 
increases or tends to infinity (T → ∞) (Judson & Owen, 1999:10).  Even when T is sufficiently large, 
Nickell (1981:1418) argues that biases may remain. He (ibid.) notes that in the RE formulation the 
consistency of the estimates relies on the initial values of the dynamic process (𝑦𝑖𝑡−1). Overall, the 
performance of the estimates in both the FE or RE settings depends on how T and N tend to infinity.  
 
Despite the complications arising from endogeneity, several econometric techniques have been 
devised to correct for such biases. Several estimators are available as an alternative to the LSDV. 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981), for example, suggest two IV estimators based on the differenced 
dynamic panel model. Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bover (1998) propose different 
GMM techniques for estimating dynamic panel data models. However, an important limitation of 
these estimators is that they are only practical when N is large. Kiviet (1995) developed the LSDVC 
as an alternative approach. These techniques are discussed below. 
 
3.5.1.1.1 Anderson and Hsiao Instrumental Variable 
 
The basic idea of the IV approach is to identify variables (instruments) that are correlated with the 
regressors, and not with the disturbances. The principal objective behind finding these instruments is 
to eliminate the correlation between the independent variables and the disturbances. Standard panel 
data analysis assumes that the independent variables in the model are strictly exogenous with respect 
to 𝜀𝑖𝑡. According to Arellano (2003:129), this implies that the independent variables are not 
correlated with the past, present and future values of 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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However, there are special cases, such as in the dynamic panel data model, where the assumption of 
strict exogeneity is violated since 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is correlated with 𝜇𝑖. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is not 
uncommon for 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 to be correlated with 𝜇𝑖, since 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is also correlated with 𝜇𝑖. This, according to 
Arellano (2003:129), effectively implies that 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is an endogenous variable. Therefore, procedures 
for IV estimation are applied to try and eliminate the effect of the correlation between 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝜇𝑖, 
on 𝑦𝑖𝑡.  Anderson and Hsiao (1981) presented one of the first attempts to do so. 
 
The AH approach is an appropriate method when the observed explanatory variables are weakly 
exogenous.  The AH approach is conducted by differencing Equation 4.3 described below to 
eliminate 𝜇𝑖. This is achieved by subtracting from each term its previous value. First differencing 
both sides of equation 3.11 yields Equation 3.12 below or alternatively Equation 3.13. However, 
even after eliminating the fixed effects, Equation 3.11 still produces inconsistent estimators for finite 
samples or when T is fixed, because the 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is still a function of 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1, implying that ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is 
correlated with the disturbances ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                               3.11 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛾(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽(𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜇𝑖𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1                                                       3.12 
 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑡 = 2, … … , 𝑇                                                                                   3.13 
 
Once the model is transformed, Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggest two estimators that use 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2, as 
an instrument for the differenced model. They argue, for example, that if the disturbances 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are IID 
[𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷 (0, 𝜎𝜀
2)] (see Section 3.4.2) over i and t, then 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 or ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 would be a valid instrument 
for ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 (Baltagi, 2008:136). Hsiao (2003:87) notes, for instance, that while ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 is correlated 
with ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, it is uncorrelated with ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡, and is therefore a valid instrument. However, a model that 
uses instruments in levels rather than differences produces more efficient estimates.  
 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) propose a two-stage least squares (TSLS) approach for estimating 𝛾 and 
𝛽. In the first stage all variables including 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 are regressed on the set of instruments using OLS; 
this is to ascertain how much of the variation in these variables is as a result of the instruments. In 
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stage two the values from the first stage are fitted into the original model to derive the instrumental 
variable estimates for 𝛾 and 𝛽.  The estimators ?̂? and ?̂? are then used to derive the variances of the 
residuals ?̂?𝜀
2 and the unobserved individual effects ?̂?𝛼
2.  
 
With reference to consistency, Hurlin (2010:46) notes that γ̂, β̂ and σ̂ε
2 are consistent when both N or 
T, or both tend to infinity. The estimate of the variance of the unobserved fixed effects ?̂?𝛼
2 is 
consistent only when N tends to infinity and is inconsistent when N is fixed. Based on these 
observations, some researchers (e.g. Bruno, 2005:474) have concluded that the AH IV approach is 
best when N is large. Moreover, he argues that while this approach produces consistent estimators, it 
does not necessarily lead to efficient estimators as it does not utilise all available moment conditions.  
  
3.5.1.1.2 Generalised Method of Moments Estimators 
 
Several GMM estimators have been developed as alternatives to IV estimators, largely because they 
rely on more instruments and therefore improve the efficiency of estimates. The AB and BB 
estimators are examples of GMM-based techniques. Indeed most of the recent estimators build on the 
foundations of these estimators.   
 
In contrast to the AH instrumental variable estimator, the AB estimator utilises all available 
instruments in a GMM context by taking into account all potential orthogonality conditions (Baum, 
2013:8). Papoulis and Pillai (2002:211) describe two variables as orthogonal if they are uncorrelated 
or linearly independent. The AB approach derives more instruments by employing the orthogonality 
conditions that existing between 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡. In the context of dynamic panel models, Blundell, Bond 
and Windmeijer (2015:58) argue that this implies making use of all lagged dependent variables that 
are uncorrelated to the differenced disturbances ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡. By incorporating all available instruments, the 
GMM approach is argued to produce more efficient estimates than the AH method (Judson and 
Owen, 1999:10). 
 
The AB approach, like the AH approach, is based on the first difference of Equation 3.13 (Hurlin, 
2010:50). The AB approach identifies lagged dependent variables as instruments only if they 
uncorrelated with the error terms. Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate that the GMM approach 
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produces more efficient estimates for 𝛾 and 𝛽 than the TSLS estimator proposed by Anderson and 
Hsiao (1981).  
 
One important draw back of the AB estimator is that the number of instruments increases as T 
increases. Judson and Owen (1999:13) argue that, as T gets larger, computation becomes more 
complicated and using all available instruments is impractical. While the GMM estimator is 
manageable when T is small – less than ten – it may be problematic for panels with larger time series. 
The panel data set used for this study has a large time dimension (T=64) which is significantly larger 
than the T=10 prescribed in the literature. A time dimension of this magnitude poses serious 
computational complications. The AB estimator is therefore more appropriate for large panels with 
shorter time series.  
 
In addition to the computational challenges faced by the AB estimator for panels with a large T, 
Blundell and Bond (1998:138) observe that AB estimators suffer a severe small-sample bias for 
highly persistent data as a result of weak instruments. In other words, the AB estimator may not 
perform well when the autoregressive parameters are too large. Therefore, they suggest a system 
GMM estimator which makes use of additional moment conditions. Specifically, the approach uses 
differenced instruments for the level model and level instruments for the differenced model (Bruno, 
2005:474). However, these additional instruments are valid only if the initial condition of strict 
exogeneity in the regressors holds. And like the AB estimator, the BB estimator is also suitable for 
large panels with short time series. 
 
A third GMM estimator, known as the dynamic panel data (DPD) estimator, uses the AB and BB 
estimators. This estimator was developed to fit more complex models, particularly those with 
correlation in the errors or those with weakly exogenous variables (StataCorp, 2017:98). This 
approach is therefore more appropriate when the assumption of strict exogeneity in the regressors 
does not hold. 
 
3.5.1.1.3 Bias-Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable Approach 
 
An important drawback of IV and GMM estimators is that they are only practical for large panels 
(Bruno, 2005:474). The foregoing discussion reveals that the GMM estimation technique suffers 
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serious complications for large T. This is common in macro panels, which tend to have a small 
number of units but longer time series. Judson and Owen (1999:13) show that while LSDV 
estimators produce just as efficient or better estimates than the IV and GMM estimators when T=30, 
they are biased in dynamic panel models, as was discussed in the preceding chapter.  
 
Given the foregoing considerations, the LSDVC model was proposed as an alternative approach to 
the IV and GMM estimators. The LSDVC estimator is calculated as a bias correction to the LSDV 
estimator. Judson and Owen (1999:13) show that the LSDVC may outperform the IV and GMM 
estimators for smaller panels. Judson and Owen (1999:10) as well as Bruno (2005:475) find strong 
evidence suggesting that the LSDVC performs very well when N is small.  
 
Although several procedures exist to correct for the bias of the LSDV estimator (Kiviet, 1995), these 
procedures are only feasible for balanced panels. The LSDVC estimator, although commonly applied 
to balanced panels, is also applicable to unbalanced panels (Bruno, 2005:476). In principle, the 
LSDVC estimator is derived by subtracting the estimated bias from the LSDV estimator as in 
Equation 3.14 below. ?̂?𝑖 in Equation 3.14 represents the approximated bias of the LSDV estimator. 
However, the approximation of the LSDV bias requires the values of the true population parameters 
of 𝛾 and 𝜎𝜀
2. To make bias correction possible, Bruno (2005:477) suggests the use of estimates from 
a consistent estimate, for example, the AH and AB estimators.  
 
𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑖
𝑗 = 𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑉 − ?̂̂?𝑖
𝑗 , 𝑖 = 1,2,3; 𝑗 = 𝐴𝐻, 𝐴𝐵.                                                                                          3.14 
 
However, the LSDVC has one major limitation. Its practicality is called into question when the 
assumption of strict exogeneity does not hold (Bruno, 2005:475). GMM estimators show more 
promise with weakly exogenous regression. Moreover, the LSDVC suffers complications when there 
are gaps in the data whether the panel is balanced or not (Bruno, 2005:481). Moreover, the 
computation of the bootstrap variance-covariance matrix requires a considerable amount of time and 
especially when the number of replications is high.  
 
The performance of each of the estimators discussed above undoubtedly depends on the 
characteristics of the data being employed (Judson & Owen, 1999:10). The QE literature is  mixed in 
terms of the preferred estimation techniques. While Burns et al. (201438) and Lim et al. (2014:9) 
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employ the LSDVC approach, Park et al. (2014) use the AB estimator. Others like Khatiwada (2017) 
employ a mix of techniques to estimate their model. This study adopts the DPD estimation technique 
as it is better suited to handle more complex data. Not only is the data set employed in this study 
unbalanced, it also has gaps. This study uses an unbalanced panel of quarterly data with a time 
dimension of T=64.  
 
3.5.2 Modelling the Impact of QE on Capital Flows to the BRICS Economies 
 
The baseline dynamic panel data model adopted in this study is described in Equation 3.15. The 
dependent variable (GCIit) and its constituent components (FDI, portfolio investments and bank 
lending) are modelled as a function of QE and a number of push and pull factors. This model is 
consistent with the recent literature on capital flows (Burns et al., 2014; Lim et al., 2014; Park et al., 
2014; Ahmed & Zlate 2013; Forbes & Warnock 2012; Fratzscher 2012) and with earlier literature on 
capital flows (e.g. Taylor & Sarno 1997).  
 
𝑔𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾𝑔𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑔𝑓𝑐𝑡 + 𝜋𝑔𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑞𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                       3.15 
  
Where 𝑔𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡 represents the log of total gross capital inflows or their sub-components expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. These are categorised into FDI (𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡), portfolio equity (𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡), portfolio debt 
(𝑝𝑑𝑖𝑡) and bank lending (𝑏𝑘𝑖𝑡). The subscript i represents the i’th country and t the t’th quarter. 𝑔𝑓𝑐𝑡 
denotes global financial conditions and includes the US federal funds rate (fed_rate); the yield curve 
(yield_curve) – US 10-year bond yield (us_10yr) minus the 3-month treasury bill rate (us_3mth); the 
log of the US money supply (m2_us); and the VIX (vix). Global real-side conditions (𝑔𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑡) include a 
measure of advanced economy growth proxied by the US real GDP growth rate (us_rgdp) and the 
real GDP growth rate for each BRICS country (brics_rgdp).  
 
The unobservable effects of QE in the USA on the BRICS are captured by the term 𝑞𝑒𝑡. 7 Various 
specifications of the baseline model are explored. Separate QE dummies are used to represent each 
episode of QE; qe1, qe2 and qe3. The other specifications include a measure of QE (fed_qe) proxied 
by the Fed’s asset expansion is included.   
                                                   
7
 In other specifications of the baseline model, separate QE dummies are included for each phase of QE. Moreover, 
the model will also consider interaction dummies between the QE indicator and standard observable determinants of 
capital flows. 
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The vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡 includes country-specific factors, namely the interest rate differential (i_dif) and 
growth differential (g_dif) of each BRICS country relative to the USA. The vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡 also includes a 
measure of each country’s institutional rating (brics_cr). The model also includes unobserved 
country-specific effects (𝜇𝑖) which capture the effects of any unobserved time invariant factors on 
capital flows to the BRICS economies. Finally, the term εit represents the disturbances which are 
assumed to be IID [𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷 (0, 𝜎𝜀
2)]. The parameters to be estimated correspond to the vector [𝛾 𝛼 𝜋 
𝜃 𝛽]. The model described in Equation 4.7 is fitted using the DPD estimator using the Stata 
command XTDPD.  
 
3.6 Data and Description of Key Variables  
 
This study uses an unbalanced panel of available quarterly data for the period 2000Q1-2015Q4 to 
model gross private capital inflows to the BRICS economies. All variables included in this model are 
at quarterly frequency. All level variables are expressed in logarithms except for rates and dummy 
variables that are untransformed. This section provides a descriptive summary of all the variables 
used in this study. These variables are also listed in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
 
3.6.1 Gross Private Capital Inflows 
 
The dependent variable, total gross private capital inflows (GCIit), is defined as the sum of changes 
in foreign holdings of FDI, portfolio investment and bank loans in the BRICS economies. GCIit 
expressed in nominal US dollars is measured as a proportion of nominal GDP of each recipient 
country. This approach is similar to many studies, for example, Bluedorn et al. (2013:8), who argue 
that presenting capital flows as a portion of GDP is important for determining the macroeconomic 
relevance of these flows. Data for gross FDI and Portfolio inflows are obtained from the IMF’s 
Balance of Payments Statistics (BPS).8 These two flows are supplemented by bank lending data from 
the BIS LBS. 
 
                                                   
8
 The IMF’s BPS database provides country-level data on a quarterly basis on different types of capital flows 
measured in US dollars. It provides data for five functional categories of capital flows, namely direct investment; 
portfolio investment which includes both debt and equity; financial derivatives (other than reserves) and employee 
stock options; other investments and reserve assets.  
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3.6.2 Capturing the Effect of Quantitative Easing 
 
The independent variable of interest is a set of variables aimed at capturing the effects of QE. The 
effect of QE on gross capital inflows is captured using dummy variables representing the different 
episodes of QE (Burns et al., 2014:36; Lim et al., 2014:10). This is achieved by experimenting with 
alternative specifications of the QE dummy variable. First, one QE dummy variable is used to 
represent all three episodes of QE. This variable takes the value of one for quarters between 2009Q1 
and 2011Q2 (included), and 2012Q4 and 2013Q2 (included). In other specifications, separate QE 
dummy variables are used to represent each of the three QE episodes (QE1, QE2 and QE3).  
 
Following the approach used in Burns et al. (2014:36), a quarter is defined as belonging to a 
particular QE episode, if more than half of the days of the quarter were affected by that episode’s 
implementation. Thus QE1 which started on 16 December, 2008 is identified as the period 2009Q1–
2010Q3, while QE2 which started on 3 November, 2010 is identified as the period 2010Q4–2011Q2, 
and finally QE3 as the period 2012Q4–2013Q2. Statistically significant coefficients on these dummy 
variables will be an indication of other influences of QE in addition to those captured through the 
conventional channels.  
 
Lastly, the model includes a measure of QE policies proxied by increases in the US Fed’s assets 
acquired during all three episodes of QE. Similar to Lim et al. (2014:9), this study considers only QE 
operations by the US Federal Reserve Bank. Data on the Fed’s expansion in assets are obtained from 
the Federal Reserve Bank.  
 
3.6.3 Pull and Push Factors 
 
Chapter 2 identified the push and pull factors that influence the pattern of capital flows. The 
remaining independent variables are therefore those that account for global financial and real-side 
conditions, as well as factors specific to the BRICS that affect the allocation of funds to these 
economies. Below is a summary of the push and pull factors modelled in this study.  
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3.6.3.1 Push Factors 
 
3.6.3.1.1 Global Financial Conditions 
 
Global financial conditions (GFCt) are captured by a measure of global interest rates, global money 
supply (liquidity) and global risk aversion. Specifically, global interest rates are proxied by the US 
federal funds rate, the US 3-month Treasury bill rate and the US 10-year bond yield, compiled from 
the IMF’s IFS database. Also included in the model is the yield curve – the 10-year US government 
bond yield minus the 3-month US Treasury bill rate. Higher global interest rates are likely to reduce 
capital inflows to EMEs, suggesting a negative correlation between capital inflows and interest rates.   
 
Similar to Burns et al. (2014:35) and Lim et al. (2014:11), this study uses the US money supply 
(M29) as a measure of available liquidity. M2 is used to measure available financing in order to 
minimise as much as possible the overlap with modifications in the monetary base resulting from 
QE. Data on the US money supply M2 are drawn from the US Federal Reserve Bank. The literature 
suggests a negative coefficient on the M2 variable.  
 
In line with the literature (e.g. Burns et al., 2014:6; Ahmed & Zlate, 2013:12; Bluedorn et al., 
2013:25), this study uses the Chicago Board of Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) of implied 
stock market volatility to capture the global perception of risk. Data on the VIX index are drawn 
from the Chicago Board Options Exchange. While data on the VIX are available at a higher 
frequency, this study uses the average of the VIX of the quarter. A lower VIX (lower global risk 
aversion) is likely to be accompanied by stronger flows, suggesting a negative coefficient a priori.  
 
3.6.3.1.2 Global Real-Side Conditions  
 
As with most studies (e.g. Burns et al., 2014:35; Ahmed & Zlate, 2013), the weighted average of the 
real GDP growth rates of advanced economies is used to capture the effects of global real-side 
conditions (GRCt). Quarterly data on the weighted average real GDP growth for advanced economies 
are obtained from the IMF’s IFS database.  Global growth represents the real incentives for investing 
                                                   
9
 M2 is a broader definition of money supply which includes cash in circulation, demand deposits and ‘near money’. 
Near money refers to assets that are highly liquid but are not cash. These include short-term and medium-term 
deposits.  
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in EMEs’ assets. However, the effect of high-income growth on capital flows to EMEs is ambiguous, 
as was discussed in Chapter 2. This implies that the coefficient on this variable could be either 
positive or negative.  
 
3.6.3.2 Pull Factors 
 
3.6.3.2.1 Interest Rate Differential 
 
The interest rate differential captures differences in short-term returns between EMEs and developed 
economies. The interest rate differential is determined by the monetary policy stance in all the 
countries. The differential is computed by subtracting the US federal funds rate from the nominal 
policy rate of each BRICS country (Ahmed & Zlate, 2013:12). A higher BRICS policy rate implies a 
positive interest rate differential. Chapter 2 showed that interest rates in the BRICS economies have 
historically been higher than interest rates in the USA. Quarterly data on monetary policy rates in the 
BRICS and the USA are obtained from the IMF IFS and individual country central banks. The 
discussion in Chapter 2 on the interest rate differential suggests a positive coefficient on this variable.  
 
3.6.3.2.2 Economic Growth Differentials 
 
The model described in Chapter 4 includes the growth rates of real GDP and growth differentials 
between each country in the BRICS relative to the weighted average GDP in advanced economies. 
This is consistent with Ahmed and Zlate (2013:11). Real GDP growth rates and growth differentials 
(quarterly BRICS real GDP growth rates minus quarterly US GDP growth rate) are used to estimate 
the effect of real economic variables on capital inflows to the BRICS economies (Ahmed & Zlate, 
2013:11). Similar to interest rate differentials, a higher growth rate in the BRICS relative to growth 
in advanced economies implies a positive growth differential. Data on real quarterly GDP growth for 
the BRICS and the US are compiled from the IMF IFS and national sources. Existing literature 
suggests that there is a positive relationship between the growth differential and capital inflows.  
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3.6.3.2.3 Sovereign Credit Ratings 
 
Sovereign credit ratings reflect several fundamental aspects of a country such as economic growth, 
debt, inflation and the ability of individual countries to repay their debt (Kim & Wu, 2008:17). This 
study considers only the long-term institutional credit ratings derived by Standard and Poor’s (S&P). 
The rationale for using only S&P ratings is that they produce credit ratings more frequently and for a 
larger group of countries than Moody’s and Fitch do. Moreover, the literature (e.g. Kim & Wu, 
2008:8) indicates that ratings produced by S&P tend to lead those produced by the other institutions. 
The choice to focus on only long-term credit ratings stems from the fact most EMEs’ foreign debt is 
long-term. However, credit rating announcements are not made regularly. They are only made when 
there are changes in the factors underpinning the credit quality of countries.  
 
In order to aid statistical analyses, these ratings are converted into a time series by assigning a value 
to each of the rating categories ranging from 0 for default to 20 for AAA. This approach is borrowed 
from Kim and Wu (2008:8). These categories are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. The ratings 
are also adjusted to include the outlook associated with each credit rating. For example, if the 
average credit rating for a country is AAA (20) and the outlook is positive (0.50), the overall long-
term credit rating for that country is 20.50.  This is consistent with the approach employed in Kim 
and Wu (2008:8).  Because credit rating announcements are not made regularly, each quarter is 
assigned the combined value of the rating and outlook preceding the announcement of the next 
rating. Empirical evidence suggests a positive correlation between credit ratings and capital flows to 
EMEs.  
 
3.7 Conclusion  
 
Studies examining the spillover effects of QE can be grouped into three. The first includes studies 
that use event study methods to examine the effect of QE around the Fed’s announcements of 
unconventional monetary policies. The second group of studies includes those that use panel data 
models to identify the long-term effects of QE on capital flows. The third group makes use of VAR 
models to study the effects of policy normalization in advanced economies on capital inflows to 
EMEs. 
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This study uses the dynamic fixed effects, as it has been widely applied in the QE literature. While 
event study methods offer insight into the behaviour of assets around the time that QE was 
implemented, they are unable to give a long-term perspective on the spillover effects of QE. 
Moreover, while VARs are ideal for analysing the effects of tapering in the USA on capital flows to 
EMEs, this study’s aim is to identify whether there were any unobservable effects of QE over and 
above those channelled through the observables, and whether these effects were different for 
different types of capital flows. 
 
In addition to identifying the appropriate approach for estimating the impact of QE on capital inflows 
to the BRICS countries, this chapter also established that most studies in the capital flows literature 
often face the difficulty of deciding whether to model gross or net capital inflows. This study models 
the behaviour of gross private capital inflows and not net inflows. This decision is guided by the 
empirical literature, which reveals that gross capital inflows are more important than net inflows for 
EMEs. Gross capital inflows and net capital inflows usually move in tandem in EMEs, because gross 
outflows are usually too small to offset gross inflows. This is different from developed countries, 
where gross outflows are often sufficient to offset gross inflows.  
 
This chapter also outlined the model adopted for examining the effect of QE on gross capital 
inflows to the BRICS economies. Consistent with recent literature on QE, this study adopted the 
dynamic panel model for this purpose. The use of dynamic panel models allows for modelling 
fixed effects – unobserved factors that are time invariant and may influence the pattern of capital 
flows. However, the presence of the lagged dependent variable introduces complications in the 
estimation of the model. Several econometric techniques exist that can produce unbiased 
estimates, despite the introduction of a lagged dependent variable. This research adopted a 
technique that fits dynamic panel models using the AB and BB GMM estimators.   
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Chapter 4  
Empirical Analysis and Results 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The preceding chapter outlined and described the baseline model used to estimate the impact of QE 
on capital inflows to the BRICS economies. This chapter presents the key econometric findings as 
shown in Section 4.2. The output of the baseline regression generally suggests that QE increased the 
amount of capital inflows to the BRICS, and in particular portfolio inflows. This finding compares 
very well with those of similar studies (e.g. Burns et al., 2014:38). In addition to presenting the main 
econometric findings, Section 4.2 tests the sensitivity of the baseline model through the introduction 
of additional controls. The results of these robustness checks indicate a noticeable drop in capital 
inflows to the BRICS during tapering expectations. Finally Section 4.3 provides the concluding 
remarks for the chapter. 
 
4.2 Econometric Results and Main Findings 
 
4.2.1 Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
Table 4.1 displays the results of the IPS and Fisher-type tests, discussed at length in Chapter 3. Both 
tests test the H0 that each time series has a unit root, but they differ slightly with respect to the H1. 
The IPS test tests the H1 that some individual series are stationary, while the Fisher-type test tests the 
H1 that at least one series is stationary. The ADF regressions for both the IPS and the Fisher-type 
tests included a time trend and fixed effects, as is standard practice in many panel data studies (see, 
for example, Baltagi, 2008:241). The ADF regressions were demeaned – that is the cross-sectional 
means were removed – to lessen the effects of cross-sectional dependence.10 The default of one lag 
was used for both tests.  
 
 
                                                   
10
 This requires that the means of each panel are subtracted from the individual series.  
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Table 4.1: Panel Unit Root Test Results for BRICS Countries 
Variables 
Im-Pesaran-Shin test Fisher-type test 
Level First Difference Level First Difference 
gci -11.2435*** -17.1791*** 114.3506*** 250.0116*** 
fdi -9.7241*** -18.1633*** 41.1455*** 268.8765*** 
pi -4.1384*** -23.5815*** 37.1302*** 259.8040*** 
pe -5.2980*** -19.9954*** 46.6801*** 303.1357*** 
pd -5.2228*** -20.3689*** 21.5328*** 189.2554*** 
bk -13.3377*** -18.3647*** 177.2386*** 272.3696*** 
brics_rgdp -4.2555*** -12.3896*** 40.0387*** 111.3429*** 
i_dif -0.6374 -11.5292*** 14.7747 104.8141*** 
g_dif -4.2555*** -12.3896*** 40.0387*** 111.3429*** 
brics_cr -2.7097*** -15.4278*** 32.4793*** 179.3110*** 
Note: ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Probability values are computed assuming asymptotic 
normality. The lag order was determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for the IPS test. Only the rho-statistic is reported for 
the Fisher-type test.  
 
The test statistics were evaluated based on the standard 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels of 
significance. If the 𝜌-value of the relevant test statistic is less than the 10 percent level of 
significance, H0 is rejected. However, when they are greater than 10 percent, H0 is not rejected. In the 
context of the IPS and Fisher-type tests, this implies that some series are stationary, while others are 
not.  
 
Table 4.1 demonstrates that all the variables excluding the i_dif (interest rate differential) variable are 
stationary both in levels and first difference.  This is true for both tests. The gci, fdi, pi, pe, pd, bk, 
brics_rgdp, g_dif and the brics_cr variables are integrated to the order of 0 or I(0), as they do not 
have to be differenced to induce stationarity. The 𝜌-values for the test statistics are less than 5 
percent, resulting in the rejection of the H0 that all the panels have unit roots. The i_dif variable 
contains unit roots in levels, but becomes stationary after first differencing – it is I(1). This is true for 
both tests.  
 
Panel unit roots tests on the remaining variables fed_qe, us_3mth, yield_curve, m2_us, vix and 
us_rgdp were not significant.  A probable explanation for this is that these variables are only reported 
for one country, the USA, and therefore have insufficient time periods. Standard time series unit root 
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tests – the ADF and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests – were used to detect stationarity in these variables. 
Both tests test the H0 that each series has a unit root, against the H1 that the series is stationary. When 
the absolute value of the test statistic is greater than the absolute value of the critical values at all the 
levels of significance, H0 is rejected. Table 4.2 displays the results of the two tests.  
 
Table 4.2: Time Series Unit Root Test Results 
Variables 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Phillips-Perron Test 
Level  First Difference Level First Difference 
fed_qe -2.017 -5.065*** -2.241 -4.877*** 
us_3mth -1.386 -3.961** -1.960 -3.987** 
yield_curve -1.650 -5.524*** -2.161 -5.549*** 
m2_us -4.000** -8.722*** -3.961** -9.027*** 
vix -3.335* -8.506*** -3.294* -8.817*** 
ae_rgdp -2.073 -5.138*** -2.649 -5.299*** 
 Note: ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Probability values are computed assuming asymptotic 
normality. The lag order was determined by the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) and Bartlett Kernel. Only the Z(t) statistic is 
reported for the Phillips-Perron test.  
 
The results indicate that only m2_us and vix are stationary in levels. The fed_qe, us_3mth, 
yield_curve and us_rgdp variables become stationary in first differences, they are I(1).   While these 
results suggest that the i_dif, fed_qe, us_3mth, yield_curve and us_rgdp should be used in their first 
difference in the regression, Enders (2015:291) warns against inducing stationarity through 
differencing, as this may result in the loss of valuable information. Engel and Granger (1987:251) 
argue, for example, that while the relationship existing between two variables may deviate in the 
short-run, they will always converge to their equilibrium in the long-run. Therefore this study will 
use all the variables in levels to preserve any valuable information contained in the data. Moreover, 
using transformed variables does not alter the main message of the findings.11  
 
4.2.2 Fixed Effects or Random Effects 
 
As indicated in the preceding chapter, researchers are often faced with the challenge of deciding 
whether to fit their models with FE or RE. The Hausman specification test was devised to test 
whether an FE or RE model is appropriate for estimating panel data. It tests the H0 that the RE model 
                                                   
11
 See Table A3 in the Appendix.  
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is appropriate and the H1 that the FE model is appropriate. In practice, as described in Baltagi 
(2008:271), the RE estimator (?̂?𝑅𝐸) is assumed to be a consistent and efficient estimator under the H0, 
but inconsistent under the H1. The FE estimator (?̂?𝐹𝐸), on the other hand, is always consistent both 
under H0 and H1, but is inefficient under H0.  
 
The Hausman specification test is conducted in Stata and proceeds by first running the FE model. 
The next step involves fitting the RE model. The estimates of the RE model are then compared to 
those of the FE model by using the Hausman command. A significant difference between the RE and 
FE estimators results in the rejection of the H0. When the 𝜌-value of the Hausman statistic is less than 
5 percent, the H0 that the RE model is suitable is rejected, meaning that the FE model is the correct 
model. However, when it is greater than 5 percent, the H0 cannot be rejected, implying that the RE 
model is the correct model. 
 
Table 4.3 shows the findings of the Hausman specification test. The 𝜌-value for the test statistic is 
less than the 5 percent. Because of this, the H0 that the RE model is suitable is rejected. This suggests 
that the FE model is the correct model. This outcome is consistent with recent literature on QE, for 
example (Burns et al., 2014), that have modelled the spillover effects of QE on EME’s financial 
assets.     
 
Table 4.3: Hausman Specification Test Results 
 Chi-Square Statistic Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom p-value 
Test Summary 45.86 11 0.000*** 
Note: ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Probability values are computed assuming asymptotic 
normality. 
 
The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test is run as a complementary test to rule out 
completely the RE model. The LM test is a test for the RE model. It tests the H0 that the pooled OLS 
model is the appropriate model against the H1 that the RE model is the applicable one. The results for 
the Breusch and Pagan LM test are presented in Table 4.4. The findings indicate that the 𝜌-value is 
greater than all the recommended levels of significance. Therefore the H0 that the pooled OLS 
regression is the appropriate model is not rejected. The results of the LM test rule out the RE model.   
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Table 4.4: Breusch & Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test for Random Effects 
 Chibar-Square Statistic Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom p-value 
Test Summary 0.00 1 1.0000 
Note: ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Probability values are computed assuming asymptotic 
normality. 
 
The results of both tests suggest that the RE model is unsuitable. This study will therefore fit the 
dynamic panel model with FE. The decision to fit the FE model is also guided by empirical evidence. 
As already alluded to, several studies similar to this one – for example, Lim et al. (2014) – have used 
the FE model. They argue that the model investigating the effect of QE on EMEs should include FE 
to account for unobserved differences among countries, which may influence the pattern of capital 
flows.  
 
4.2.3 Model Adequacy Tests 
 
In addition to choosing between the RE and FE model, this study ran diagnostic tests to ascertain the 
adequacy of the model described in Equation 4.7. As argued in Section 3.4.5, the purpose of these 
tests is not to ascertain whether the model is wrong, but rather to determine the gravity of any 
irregularities. Section 3.4.5 also showed that model adequacy tests often involve checking the 
behaviour of residuals of the estimated model. A model is argued to be a good model when it has 
well-behaved residuals which are normally distributed, homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated. This 
study employs the Wald Statistic for groupwise heteroscedasticity and Wooldridge’s test to test for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, respectively.  
 
The Wald Statistic for groupwise heteroscedasticity tests the H0 that the residuals are homoscedastic 
across individuals, against the alternative hypothesis that they are heteroscedastic. The results of the 
Wald Statistic for groupwise heteroscedasticity are presented in Table 4.5 below. The 𝜌-value is less 
than 5 percent, resulting in the rejection of the H0 that the residuals are homoscedastic. This implies 
that the variance of the residuals is not the same across individuals in the panel. Heteroscedasticity 
can be corrected by deriving robust standard errors.  
 
Section 3.4.5.2 established that serial correlation can result in extremely biased estimates. The 
Wooldridge test is one of the most attractive and flexible tests for detecting serial correlation. It tests 
the H0 of no serial correlation against the H1 of serial correlation. The Pesaran test for cross-sectional 
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dependence is used as a complementary test. Like the Wooldridge test, the Pesaran test also tests the 
H0 of no serial correlation against the H1 of serial correlation. The results of both tests are shown in 
Table 4.5 below. The probability values of the test statistics on both the Wooldridge and Pesaran 
tests are more than 1 percent. Therefore the H0 that there is no serial correlation cannot be rejected in 
both cases. This implies that serial correlation is not present in the data.   
 
Table 4.5: Test for Autocorrelation and Heteroscedasticity 
 Tests for Autocorrelation Test for Heteroscedasticity 
 Wooldridge Test  Pesaran Test Wald Test 
Test Statistic 0.643 -0.699 357.74 
𝝆-value (0.4674) (1.5156) (0.0000)*** 
Note: ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively 
 
4.2.4 Baseline Regression Results 
 
The baseline regression estimates are displayed in Table 4.6. The baseline regression estimates are 
obtained through two specifications: one that only includes the 3-month US T-bill rate, yield curve, 
interest rate differential and the VIX, and an extended specification that includes the money supply 
(M2) and the growth differential. The first specification includes what Lim et al. (2014:13) term 
primary indicators, while the second includes secondary indicators. The inclusion of other controls, 
including each country’s institutional credit rating and GDP growth, are varied in each specification. 
The QE dummy variables are also altered in the two specifications. Columns I-III represents results 
from the reduced specification, while columns the remaining columns correspond to the extended 
specification.  
 
4.2.4.1 The Persistence of Capital Flows 
 
The extent to which capital flows persist over time is something of interest in discussions regarding 
the volatility of capital flows. A distinction is often made between cold flows, perceived to be 
relatively stable, and hot flows, seen to be more volatile. The persistence of gross capital flows is 
measured by calculating correlations of the dependent variable with its own past values. In this case 
it is the coefficient on lagged inflows (𝑔𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡−1) in Table 4.6. According to Becker and Noone 
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(2008:167), cold flows present a strong positive relationship with their past values, while hot flows 
have a weaker positive correlation. 
 
The coefficient on lagged inflows is positive and significant across the various regressions, indicating 
some degree of persistence in the dependent variable. This is characteristic of most emerging 
economies, which tend to exhibit a lower degree of persistence than high-income countries. 
However, when compared to other EMEs, the persistence of gross flows is generally lower in the 
BRICS countries. The coefficient of lagged gross capital inflows ranges between 0.15-0.19 (Table 
4.6). This is less pronounced than what has been reported in other comparable studies. This could be 
an indication that capital flows to the BRICS are more unpredictable, compared to other EMEs. The 
degree of persistence in the various components of capital flows is considered in another section 
below. 
 
Table 4.6: Baseline Regression Results Unbalanced Quarterly Panel 2001Q1-2015Q4 
 
I II III IV V VI 
Dependent variable: Gross 
Inflows 
Gross 
Inflows 
Gross 
Inflows 
Gross 
Inflows 
Gross 
Inflows 
Gross 
Inflows 
Lagged inflows 0.1892 
(0.000)*** 
0.1949 
(0.000)*** 
0.1681 
(0.000)*** 
0.1880 
(0.000)***  
0.1944 
(0.000)*** 
0.1463 
(0.002)*** 
All QE Episodes 0.0453 
(0.011)** 
    
0.0551 
(0.003)*** 
    
QE1 episode   
0.0607 
(0.013)** 
    
0.0667 
(0.007)*** 
  
QE2 episode   
0.0476 
(0.079)* 
    
0.0605 
(0.032)** 
  
QE3 episode   
0.0161 
(0.616) 
    
0.0223 
(0.516)  
  
QE-related expansion     
-0.0061 
(0.812) 
    
0.2455 
(0.000)*** 
Global Financial-side Conditions 
3-month T-bill rate -0.0028 
(0.734) 
-0.0066 
(0.461) 
-0.0039 
(0.781) 
0.0015 
(0.926)  
-0.0067 
 (0.704) 
-0.0068 
(0.694)  
Yield Curve 0.0164 
(0.159) 
0.0224 
(0.079)* 
0.0003 
(0.982) 
 0.0159 
(0.355)   
0.0261 
(0.180)  
0.0304 
(0.103) 
VIX -0.0028 
(0.003)*** 
-0.0030 
(0.0002)*** 
-0.0036 
(0.001)*** 
-0.0023 
(0.039)**  
 -0.0027 
(0.021)**  
-0.0043 
(0.001)*** 
Money supply (M2) 
   
-0.0268 
(0.710) 
-0.0496 
(0.511) 
-0.7699 
(0.000)***  
Global Real-side Conditions 
BRICS GDP Growth 
0.0039 
(0.151) 
0.0039 
(0.162) 
0.0056 
(0.076)* 
0.0325 
(0.027)**  
0.0295 
(0.051)* 
0.0169 
(0.301)  
Advanced Economy GDP Growth 
0.0041 
(0.436) 
0.0044 
(0.430) 
-0.0011 
(0.840) 
-0.0210 
(0.115) 
-0.0189 
(0.176)  
-0.0105 
(0.469)  
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Note: All level variables are in logarithmic form, but rates and indicator variables are untransformed. P-values are reported in the 
parentheses. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
 
4.2.4.2 Accounting for Push and Pull Factors 
 
The push versus pull factors debate is not new in the literature. This is discussed at length in Chapters 
2 and 3. To provide more understanding into the factors driving capital flows to the BRICS countries, 
the model outlined in Section 4.2.2 controls for the impact of observable global financial and real 
conditions (push ) as well as country-specific factors (pull ) on capital flows. The findings reported in 
Table 4.6 reveal differences in the way these factors influence capital flows to the BRICS.  
 
Lower interest rates in high-income countries have historically been associated with a rise in capital 
flows to emerging economies, suggesting a negative relationship. However, this was difficult to 
establish in this study. The results in Table 4.6 suggest that US interest rates were not particularly 
responsible for the behaviour of capital flows to the BRICS in the period under review. The 
coefficients on the US T-bill rate and yield curve are indistinguishable from zero. This result is 
different from the findings of recent empirical work. For example, Lim et al. (2014:15) show that 
there is a negative relationship between the US 3-month T-bill rate and financial flows to emerging. 
This supports the argument that reductions in interest rates due to QE raised the return on short-term 
treasury bills, leading investors to rebalance their portfolios away from developing country assets, 
resulting in a decline in EMEs’ capital flows.  
 
Consistent with theory, the coefficient on money supply (M2) is negative in all the specifications. 
However, it is difficult to determine the importance of global liquidity in driving capital flows to the 
BRICS economies, because the effect of this is indistinguishable from zero, except in specification 
VI. This may have something to do with the way that the money supply variable correlates with the 
different measures of QE, as this is the only variable that is altered across all three specifications. 
Country-specific Controls 
Interest Rate Differential 0.0085 
(0.000)*** 
0.0084 
(0.000)*** 
0.0068 
(0.007)*** 
0.0088 
(0.000)***  
0.0086 
(0.000)***  
0.0063 
(0.011)**  
Growth Differential 
   
-0.0282 
(0.047)**  
-0.0255 
(0.081)* 
-0.0117 
(0.452)  
BRICS GDP 
-0.0074 
(0.393) 
-0.0092 
(0.301) 
0.0046 
(0.644) 
-0.0022 
(0.819) 
-0.0032 
(0.738) 
0.0130 
(0.196) 
BRICS Country Institutional Rating 
0.0382 
(0.000)*** 
0.0369 
(0.000)*** 
0.0456 
(0.000)*** 
 0.0418 
(0.000)***  
0.0407 
(0.000)***  
0.0518 
(0.000)***  
Constant 21.703 
(0.000)*** 
20.6372 
(0.000)*** 
21.0278 
(0.000)*** 
21.3209 
(0.000)*** 
21.9139 
(0.000)*** 
37.1943 
(0.000)*** 
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Table 4.7 reveals that money supply (M2) correlates very strongly with the QE-related expansion 
measure compared to the other QE indicators. This is not surprising, as the Fed’s QE operations 
affect the monetary base. In any case, comparable studies (e.g. Burns et al., 2014:38) similarly fail to 
establish the importance of global liquidity also proxied by money supply M2, for capital flows to 
EMEs.  
 
Table 4.7: Pairwise Correlations 
 Money Supply (M2) 
All QE Episodes 0.3250 
QE1 Episode 0.1351 
QE2 Episode 0.1585 
QE3 Episode 0.2546 
QE-related Expansion 0.9692 
 
Consistent with a priori expectations, Table 4.6 indicates that investors’ perception of risk is an 
important predictor of gross capital inflows to the BRICS countries. The VIX reports a negative and 
significant coefficient in all the regressions, implying that an increase in investors’ perception of risk 
is accompanied by a reduction in gross inflows. Burns et al. (2014:38), Lim et al. (2014) and Park et 
al. (2014:5), among others, find similar results. An IMF study reveals that the way in which the VIX 
influences gross inflows is contingent on its level (IMF, 2014b:12). That is, when the VIX is very 
low, small changes do not affect the level of capital inflows to a group of EMEs. However, when it is 
very high, marginal changes in the VIX became important drivers of capital flows.  Investigating 
whether this is true for the BRICS countries is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
The coefficients on the variables representing global real-side conditions show conflicting results. 
For example, the coefficient on the BRICS GDP growth enters the model positive but is insignificant 
in all the regressions. This finding is contrary to what much of the literature on capital flows (e.g. 
Burns et al., 2014:37; Lim et al., 2014:14; Park et al., 2014; Suttle, Huefner & Koepke 2013:6) has 
found – that EMEs’ real GDP growth is an important predictor of capital inflows. The expectation is 
that higher growth rates generally improve the relative attractiveness of developing countries for 
international investors. However, the findings of Park et al. (2014:6) are similar to those found in this 
study – they also fail to prove that EMEs’ growth rates have an effect on gross inflows.  
 
77 
 
Similarly, the outcomes presented in Table 4.6 fail to support the notion that high-income country 
growth rates impact positively on capital flows to EMEs.  Stronger real-side activity in high-income 
countries is likely to increase investment opportunities overall and increase flows to EMEs, hence 
one would expect a positive coefficient. However, the influence of world growth on capital flows is 
somewhat ambiguous; while it has been found to positively affect capital flows in some studies, 
others have found a negative correlation (Burns et al., 2014:36), as was discussed in Chapter 2.   
 
The results presented in Table 4.6 confirm that capital inflows to the BRICS are strongly affected by 
domestic factors. The interest rate differential enters the model with positive and significant 
coefficients. Higher interest rates in the BRICS economies relative to the US interest rates are 
accompanied by growth in capital inflows into the BRICS economies. These findings speak to the 
theoretical arguments presented in Chapter 2 and support the notion that investors went in search of 
higher yields in emerging market assets. However, Burns et al. (2014:39) and Lim et al. (2014:15) 
fail to prove that interest rate differentials impact EMEs’ capital inflows. 
 
The coefficient on the growth differential suggests effects that are contrary to literature and theory. 
For example, the findings of Suttle (2013:9) support what theory says about the effect of growth 
differentials on capital inflows, i.e. that a positive growth differential increases capital inflows to 
emerging economies. The coefficient on the growth differential is significant, but negative across all 
specifications, suggesting that an increase in the BRICS countries’ growth rates relative to that of 
high-income countries results in a decline in capital flows to EMEs (Table 4.6). While this outcome 
is not in line with recent literature, it may suggest that other factors were more important in driving 
capital flows after the GFC. For example, it is possible that the reduction in investors’ tolerance of 
risk countered the effect of the positive growth differential. The IMF (2014:4) shows, for example, 
that when VIX is high, signalling high risk aversion, its impact on capital flows is large, compared to 
when it is low, when country-specific factors become more important drivers.  
 
The country investor ratings variable enters the model with positive and highly significant 
coefficients. This is in accordance with recent literature (e.g. Burns et al., 2014:38; Lim et al., 
2014:15; Park et al., 2014:5) that show evidence of a strong correlation between country ratings and 
capital flows.   
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Overall, the results presented above suggest that global and domestic economic and financial 
fundamentals are essential drivers of capital inflows to the BRICS economies. However, the results 
suggest that global factors tend to dominate domestic factors, with global conditions accounting for 
about three-fifths of the increase in capital inflows and domestic conditions for the remaining two-
fifths. The various effects are summarised in Figure 4.1 below, which illustrates how capital inflows 
respond to a one standard deviation change in each of the push and pull factors.  
 
Figure 4.1: Impact of Push and Pull Factors on Gross Capital Inflows to the BRICS 
 
Source: Author’s Own Construction 
 
4.2.4.3 Understanding the Effects of QE 
 
The coefficients on the QE episode indicators are statistically significant as shown in Table 4.6. This 
suggests that QE induced additional gross capital inflows over and above the channels modelled in 
the baseline model. The coefficient on the QE indicator (all QE episodes) suggests that QE resulted 
in growth in capital inflows of approximately 0.05/ (1-0.19) ≈ 6 percent, over and above the effect 
QE may have had on the traditional determinants of capital inflows.  
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When the QE variable is broken down into three separator indicator variables, the point estimates 
suggest a diminishing effect of QE from QE1 to QE3. The coefficient on the QE1 variable is than 
that on QE2, and is actually insignificant for QE3. This finding is comparable to the results of other 
empirical works (e.g. Fratzcher et al., 2013:17; Burns et al., 2014:38) and indeed supports the 
argument that the first round of QE was more effective than the later rounds of QE.  
 
However, Lim et al. (2014:12) warn that care should be taken when interpreting these results. They 
argue that coefficients on the QE variables do not represent the full effects of QE and that the 
interpretation of the coefficients should be restricted to establishing whether or not QE had any 
additional unobservable effects on gross capital inflows. Therefore the estimated effect of the 
unobserved component should be treated as the minimum potential effect of QE. This implies that 
the minimum effect of QE on gross capital inflows to each country would probably be around 6 
percent (see Table 4.6).  
 
4.2.4.4 Decomposition of Gross Capital Inflows 
 
Gross capital inflows are by definition the sum of FDI, portfolio debt and equity, and bank flows. It 
can be expected that not all forms of capital flows will be affected in the same way by QE. Economic 
theory shows that portfolio and FDI flows respond to fundamentally different factors. Empirical 
literature reveals that while push factors may be more important for portfolio flows, FDI is more 
concerned with pull factors. This section breaks down the dependent variable – gross capital inflows 
– so as to better understand whether the spillover effects of QE are different for different components 
of capital inflows.  
 
Table 4.8 reports the estimates based on the extended model for each component of 𝑔𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡. The results 
suggest differences in the behaviour of each component of capital inflows. To start with, the results 
reveal that there is a positive relationship between FDI inflows and their past values, suggesting a 
high degree of persistence. This speaks to the empirical literature, which suggests that gross FDI 
flows are less volatile and destabilising than portfolio and bank loans. The reason, as explained in 
Becker and Noone (2008:160), is that FDI inflows require a longer-term commitment and are 
therefore seen to be more stable and unlikely to reverse. This is in contrast to portfolio or bank flows, 
which are usually seen as conduits of speculation by investors seeking short-term gains.  
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Table 4.8: Decomposition of Gross Capital Inflows (2001Q1-2015Q4) 
 
Looking specifically at FDI flows, apart from lagged inflows, only the country rating is statistically 
significant. This emphasises the significance of the regulatory environment for FDI flows (Lim et al., 
2014:24). FDI inflows are mostly unresponsive to the global drivers of capital flows. Portfolio 
inflows, on the other hand, tend to be more responsive to push factors than to pull factors. Lim et al. 
(2014:24) note that this is because portfolio flows react mainly to economic conditions in high-
income countries. However, when broken down into equity and debt flows, the results suggest a fair 
balance between their responsiveness to both push and pull factors. The results in Table 4.8 reveal 
fairly strong sensitivity of bank flows to the interest rate differential and country ratings.   
 
Dependent Variable: 
FDI 
Inflows 
Portfolio 
Inflows 
Portfolio Equity 
Inflows 
Portfolio Debt 
Inflows 
Bank Loan 
Inflows 
Lagged inflows 0.5175 
(0.000)*** 
-0.0243 
(0.618) 
-0.0297  
(0.542) 
-0.0693 
(0.127) 
0.1531 
(0.016)** 
All QE Episodes 0.0172 
(0.752) 
 0.3981 
(0.008)*** 
0.5563 
(0.000)*** 
-0.2219 
(0.194) 
-0.0544 
(0.684) 
Global Financial Conditions 
3-month T-bill rate -0.0284 
(0.542) 
-0.1799 
(0.166) 
-0.0560 
(0.674) 
-0.3246 
(0.028)** 
-0.0525 
(0.635) 
Yield Curve 0.0492 
(0.330) 
0.2069 
(0.142) 
0.1241 (0.392) 
0.1626 
(0.311) 
0.0745 
(0.513) 
VIX -0.0029 
(0.360) 
-0.0469 
(0.000)*** 
-0.0542 
(0.000)*** 
-0.0250 
(0.013)** 
-0.0133 
(0.071)* 
Money supply (M2) 0.0257 
(0.907) 
-1.1420 
(0.054)* 
-0.6411 
(0.292) 
-2.7597 
(0.000)*** 
0.4255 
(0.495) 
Global Real-side Conditions 
BRICS GDP Growth 
-0.0657 
(0.131) 
0.0095 
(0.938) 
0.0480 (0.703) 
-0.1871 
(0.171) 
0.0081 
(0.936) 
Advanced Economy GDP Growth 
0.0645 
(0.101) 
-0.0442 
(0.695) 
-0.0822 (0.481) 
0.1266 
(0.307) 
0.0165 
(0.855) 
Country-specific Factors 
Interest Rate Differential 0.0055 
(0.427) 
0.0068 
(0.699) 
0.0307 (0.091)* 
-0.0183 
(0.365) 
0.0460  
(0.011)** 
Growth Differential 0.0703 
(0.092) 
0.0060 
(0.959) 
-0.0379 
(0.757) 
0.1525 
(0.247) 
-0.0030 
(0.975) 
BRICS GDP 
-0.0235 
(0.419) 
-0.0528 
(0.496) 
-0.1494 
(0.060)* 
0.2312 
(0.009)*** 
0.0531 
(0.454) 
BRICS Country Institutional Rating 
0.1041 
(0.000)*** 
0.0338 
(0.436) 
0.0467 (0.297) 
0.2363 
(0.000)*** 
0.1292 
(0.004)*** 
Constant 12.2021 
(0.050)** 
60.6094 
(0.001)*** 
51.7921 
(0.004)*** 
104.8301 
(0.000)*** 
6.8111 
(0.699) 
Note: All level variables are in logarithmic form, but rates and indicator variables are untransformed. P-values are reported in the 
parentheses. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
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Comparing the responsiveness of the various components of gross capital inflows to QE, the results 
suggest that portfolio flows, and in particular equity flows, are the most sensitive to the unobservable 
effects of QE. While Lim et al. (2014:24) also show that portfolio flows are the most sensitive to QE, 
they note that it is bond flows that are most responsive. Portfolio flows are more sensitive to QE than 
overall capital flows; the coefficient on the QE indicator for portfolio flows is 0.3981 compared to 
0.0551 for overall capital flows. This is not surprising, given the understanding that portfolio flows 
are more responsive to conventional monetary policy and are easier to reallocate than the other 
components of capital flows (Lim et al. (2014:26). The other flows indicate no significant 
relationship with the QE indicator, suggesting that they are not responsive to the unobservable effects 
of QE.  
 
4.2.5 Robustness of the Baseline Regression 
 
This segment of the study examines the sensitivity of the baseline model through the introduction of 
additional controls to the baseline model. First, two dummies – crisis and post-crisis – are introduced 
into the model. Recent literature on the spillover effects of QE (e.g. Park et al., 2014:4) on capital 
flows to developing countries include a crisis variable so as to capture the effects of the sharp drop in 
capital flows during the GFC. In the same vein, a post-crisis indicator to account for the influence of 
the recovery and stagnation of capital flows after the GFC. These dummies take the value of one for 
quarters ranging from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2, and 2009Q3 to 2013Q2, respectively. Studies have found 
the crisis dummy to be statistically significant.  
 
The second and final set of tests attempts to estimate the influence of QE tapering on gross capital 
inflows to the BRICS economies. This is done by introducing two indicators to the baseline model, 
one accounting for the effects of tapering expectations and the other for the actual tapering. 
Anticipation of the tapering of QE began in the third quarter of 2013, while the actual tapering began 
on 18 December 2013 and ended on 29 October 2014. Tapering expectations are captured through an 
indicator that takes the value of one in 2013Q2 and zero in other periods. Similarly, the variable 
representing actual QE tapering takes the value of one in 2014Q1, 2014Q2 and 2014Q3.  
 
Table 4.9 shows the results of these tests. Interestingly, while the crisis indicator reports a negative 
value, implying that capital inflows fell during the GFC, this is not significant (R1). The post-crisis 
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dummy on the other hand reports a positive and significant coefficient (R2). This outcome speaks to 
the literature that reveals that capital inflows normalised after the GFC.  
  
Table 4.9: Robustness Regressions for Gross Capital Inflows (2001Q1-2015Q4) 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 
Dependent variable: Gross  
Inflows 
Gross  
Inflows 
Gross  
Inflows 
Gross  
Inflows 
Lagged inflows 0.1876 
(0.000)*** 
0.1757 
(0.000)***  
0.2032 
(0.000)*** 
0.1802 
(0.000)*** 
All QE Episodes  0.0551 
(0.003)*** 
0.0101  
(0.681) 
 0.0635 
(0.001)*** 
 0.0600 
(0.002)*** 
QE tapering expectations     
-0.1179 
(0.015)** 
  
Actual QE Tapering     
 
 0.0425 
(0.184) 
Global Financial-side Conditions 
3-month T-bill rate 0.0024 
(0.886) 
0.0300  
(0.110)  
-0.0081 
 (0.621) 
-0.0037 
 (0.819)  
Yield Curve 0.0151 
 (0.401) 
- 0.0136  
(0.497)   
0.0266 
 (0.132)  
0.0225 
 (0.209) 
VIX -0.0022 
(0.086)* 
-0.0021 
(0.062)*  
 -0.0028 
(0.013)**  
-0.0022 
(0.044)** 
Money supply (M2) -0.0235 
(0.756) 
0.0678  
(0.392) 
-0.0527  
(0.469) 
-0.0588 
 (0.440)  
Global Real-side Conditions 
BRICS GDP Growth 
0.0333 
(0.032)** 
0.0348 
(0.017)**  
0.0258 
(0.083)* 
0.0306 
(0.039)**  
Advanced Economy GDP Growth 
-0.0222 
 (0.147) 
-0.0277 
(0.039)** 
-0.0162  
(0.227)  
-0.0189 
(0.159)  
Country-specific Controls 
Interest Rate Differential 0.0088 
(0.000)*** 
0.0091 
(0.000)***  
0.0084 
(0.000)***  
0.0088 
(0.000)***  
Growth Differential -0.0289 
(0.053)* 
-0.0317 
(0.025)**  
-0.0220 
(0.126) 
-0.0262 
(0.066)*  
BRICS GDP 
-0.0020 
(0.838) 
-0.0083 
(0.386) 
-0.0029 
(0.757) 
0.0016 
(0.867) 
BRICS Country Institutional Rating 
0.0419 
(0.000)*** 
 0.0712 
(0.000)***  
0.0398 
(0.000)***  
0.0426 
(0.000)***  
Additional Controls 
Crisis period -0.0068 
(0.873) 
   
Post-crisis period 
 
0.0712 
(0.005)*** 
  
Constant 21.2173 
(0.000)*** 
18.8892 
(0.000)*** 
21.7924 
(0.000)*** 
22.4647 
(0.000)*** 
 Note: All level variables are in logarithmic form, but rates and indicator variables are untransformed. P-values are reported 
in the parentheses. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
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QE tapering expectations are associated with a noteworthy decline in gross capital inflows as shown 
by the negative significant coefficient on the QE tapering indicator (R3). The coefficient on this 
variable is more than twice the average effects of QE over all previous episodes. The period of actual 
QE tapering recorded an increase in gross capital inflows (R4). However, this increase is not as much 
as the increase witnessed in previous QE episodes.  This is contrary to the views expressed in much 
of the literature which suggest that a reversal of QE would have led to weaker capital inflows to 
developing countries (e.g. Burns et al., 2014:2).  
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
The Hausman specification test confirms that the FE model is the preferred choice.  Unit root 
tests reveal that the BRICS-related variables, with the exception of the interest rate differential, 
are stationary.  The interest rate differential once transformed to first difference becomes 
stationary. A number of the US-related variables are stationary only in first difference. Model 
adequacy tests, in particular the tests for serial correlation, reveal that autocorrelation is not a 
problem in the data. However, the tests for heteroscedasticity show that the residuals are 
heteroscedastic, implying that the variance of the residuals is not the same across individual 
countries in the panel. Heteroscedasticity is corrected by deriving robust standard errors.  
 
The regression output reveals that QE had a positive effect on gross capital inflows to the BRICS 
economies, over and above the effect that is modelled through the traditional drivers of capital 
inflows. The results further reveal a diminishing impact of the QE episodes on capital flows, 
with QE1 having the largest impact and the effect of QE3 being indistinguishable from zero. 
Further, gross capital inflows responded positively to a number of pull factors, for example, the 
interest rates differential and the individual country ratings. The response of gross capital inflows 
to push factors is less obvious. While capital inflows respond positively to the perceived global 
risk, their response to US interest rates is contrary to a priori expectations. When decomposed 
into their distinct components, the results show that portfolio flows, and in particular equity, are 
the most sensitive to the unobservable effects of QE.  
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Finally the baseline model is robust to different specifications. The addition of extra variables 
does not change the main message – QE worked through unobservable channels to increase gross 
capital inflows to the BRICS economies. Interestingly, the robustness checks also reveal a 
substantial decline in gross inflows to the BRICS during the anticipations of the tapering of QE.  
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Chapter 5  
General Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This study investigated the impact of QE on gross private capital inflows to the BRICS 
economies. In keeping with this objective, the study employed a dynamic panel data model with 
FE. Chapter 1 set out the background and explained the significance of the study. Chapter 2 
reviewed both the theoretical and empirical literature on QE. Chapter 3 provided a discussion of 
the methods commonly used to assess the spillover effects of QE on capital flows, the 
methodological debates in the capital flows literature and the variables used in the study. Chapter 
4 outlined the baseline model for estimating the impact of QE on capital inflows and presented 
the main econometric results.  
 
Chapter 1 summarised how what seemed to be a manageable crisis in the US real estate market 
spread to other countries, throwing the global economy into recession. Chapter 2 demonstrated 
that central banks, especially those in high-income countries, responded by cutting policy rates 
even to levels constrained by the ZLB. However, the global recession created an environment in 
which successive policy rate cuts were ineffective in stimulating economic activity. Realising 
this, policy makers in high-income countries turned to unconventional monetary policies which 
came to be called ‘QE. Central banks in developed countries conducted LSAPs with the aim of 
lowering long-term interest rates.  
 
The US Federal Reserve Bank emerged as the most active in these asset purchases. 
Consequently, the Fed engaged in three rounds of QE between 2008 and 2013. While these 
rounds of QE may have been effective in encouraging growth in the USA and other countries, 
the review of empirical literature reveals that QE may have increased capital inflows to EMEs. 
Several studies have found evidence in support of this. The empirical literature shows significant 
volatility in capital inflows to EMEs, especially in the years following the GFC. Empirical 
analyses reveal that QE increased capital inflows to EMEs, suggesting that QE had an impact on 
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capital inflows in addition to the effect occurring through traditional observable push and pull 
factors.  
 
Chapter 3 shows that the studies investigating the spillover effects of QE on capital inflows can 
be grouped into three categories – those that use event study methods, panel data models or VAR 
models. Event studies have been criticised for failing to account for actual QE operations, with 
most studies stating that QE announcements alone are not sufficient to explain the spillover 
effects of QE. VAR models have been criticised for the difficulties associated with choosing the 
appropriate lag length and for using very little economic theory when choosing the appropriate 
specification. Dynamic panel data models have therefore emerged as the popular method for 
estimating the spillover effects of QE and have consequently been adopted in this thesis. 
 
5.2 Main Findings 
 
The first part of Chapter 4 outlined the dynamic panel model employed in this study. It described 
the bias arising from the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the individual 
FE. This renders standard panel data methods useless. Several IV and GMM estimators have 
been devised to correct for this bias. This study used the dynamic panel data estimation 
technique that fits dynamic panel models using the AB and BB GMM estimators. The results of 
this estimator were presented in the latter part of Chapter 4.  
 
The Hausman Specification test confirms what most of the recent literature on QE suggests, 
namely that the fixed effects model is the preferred choice. Unit root test reveal that all the 
BRICS-related variables, except for the interest differential, are stationary in levels. Most of the 
US-related variables are I(1). The use of differenced variables does not generate any different 
results; therefore the study maintains the variables in levels. Model adequacy tests reveal the 
presence of heteroscedasticity but no serial correlation. While the literature suggests the use of 
robust standard errors to take care of heteroscedasticity, the regression results did not generate 
robust standard errors due to the sample size.  
 
87 
 
5.2.1 Push Factors Dominate Pull Factors 
 
The findings on the relative importance of push and pull factors are consistent with recent 
literature. The results suggest that global factors were more important in influencing the pattern 
of capital flows to the BRICS economies – global factors accounted for approximately three-
fifths of the increase in capital inflows while domestic factors accounted for the remaining two-
fifths. Capital inflows to the BRICS economies correlated in particular with the VIX, the interest 
rate differential and the sovereign credit ratings.  
 
5.2.2 Quantitative Easing Increased Capital Inflows to the BRICS 
 
QE had a positive and significant effect on gross capital inflows to the BRICS economies. This 
implies that QE worked through unobservable channels to increase capital inflows to the BRICS 
economies. The estimates of the baseline model further reveal that QE had a diminishing effect 
on capital flows – QE1 having the largest impact on gross capital inflows. The impact of QE2 
was smaller, while that of QE3 was negative. 
 
5.2.3 The Impact of QE was Greater on Portfolio Flows  
 
When decomposed into different components, the results reveal differences in the impact of QE 
for different types of capital flows. The results suggest that portfolio flows, and in particular 
equity flows, are the most sensitive to the effects of QE. Other studies find bond flows to be 
more responsive to the effects of QE. The sensitivity of portfolio flows to QE is greater than that 
of overall capital flows.  
 
5.2.4 Robustness Checks 
 
Finally, the results are also robust to various specifications. The inclusion of additional variables 
does not change the main result – QE worked through unobservable channels to increase gross 
capital inflows to the BRICS economies. Interestingly, the robustness checks reveal that the 
88 
 
anticipations of QE tapering were associated with a substantial decline in gross inflows to the 
BRICS economies.   
 
5.3 Limitations of the Study 
 
The size of the panel used in this study posed a major challenge, as it was difficult to apply 
alternative estimation techniques that require a larger cross-section dimension relative to the time 
dimension. This also made it difficult to control for heteroscedasticity by deriving robust standard 
errors. Another limitation the study faced was the difficulty in assigning a direct effect of QE to the 
increase in capital inflows to the BRICS economies. As argued by studies such as Burns et al. (2014) 
and Lim et al. (2014), doing so would require first measuring the impact of QE on the traditional 
drives of capital inflows.   
 
5.4 Areas for Further Research 
 
The argument that monetary policies of developed countries have large spillover effects on emerging 
countries is not new. Sudden surges in capital inflows, often reflecting changes in advanced economy 
monetary policies have been linked to financial instability in a number of EMEs. For example, a 
sudden reversal of capital inflows has been shown to result in significant exchange rate depreciation 
in a number of EMEs, creating a number of macroeconomic challenges in these countries. This study 
adds to the body of literature investigating the spillover effects of QE to EMEs. Therefore, the 
findings of this study offer more insight into how capital inflows to the BRICS were influenced by 
QE.  
 
Past experience has shown that central banks in developed countries do not consider the possible 
impact of their monetary policies on developing and emerging countries such as the BRICS. This 
study focused on the specific set of developed country monetary policies referred to as 'QE' – policies 
that were deemed appropriate for the very unique circumstances that prevailed after the GFC. It is 
difficult to say if these circumstances will ever occur again or if they do, if it will be in a similar 
manner. Therefore it is possible that QE might not be implemented again for a long time. It will 
therefore be presumptuous to draw policy implications for emerging economies from the findings of 
this study.  
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The closest that the empirical results of this study can come to allowing any policy implications to be 
drawn from them, is that this study confirmed the finding of many other studies that monetary 
policies of developed countries have some impact on capital flows to developing countries. This may 
suggest that developing countries should factor in developed country monetary policies in their 
policy-making processes. Moreover, as with other similar studies, this study does not necessarily 
capture the full effects of QE; doing so would require estimating the impact of QE on the drivers of 
capital flows. For example, this would entail estimating the impact of QE on short-term nominal 
interest rates. Therefore further research to investigate for example how QE influenced other drivers 
of capital inflows is necessary to get a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of QE on 
capital inflows.  
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Appendix 
 
A1: Event Study 
 
Event studies are popular in finance research, where they have been used to examine the behaviour of 
equity and bond prices around corporate events for instance mergers, stock splits and earnings 
announcements (Mackinlay, 1997:13). However, their use is also abundant in other fields of research, 
for example, in economics, where they have been used to examine the influence of changes in the 
regulatory environment on the behaviour of asset prices. Overall event studies aim to ascertain any 
abnormal (or beyond expected) behaviour of asset prices following an occurrence.  
 
Event study methods are premised on the assumption that markets are efficient. Simons and Laryea 
(2005:7) define market efficiency as the ability of the market to fully absorb new information and 
instantaneously reflect this in prices. Given an efficient market, Mackinlay (1997:13) argues that 
prices will instantly reflect the impact of an event.  Therefore, any abnormal performance in the 
value of an asset can be attributed to the event (Kothari & Warner, 2006:5). In other words, the 
magnitude of any unusual performance in prices is the measure of an event’s influence on the value 
of an asset.   
 
Event studies date back as far as the pioneering work of James Dolley (1933), who used them to 
examine changes in prices of assets at the time of stock splits. Nageswara Rao and Sreejith (2014:41) 
observe that event studies have evolved in sophistication with several modifications to accommodate 
new developments in research. Mackinlay (1997:13) notes that perhaps the version of the event study 
methodology closest to the one used today is the one introduced by Eugene Fama (1969), who 
analyses the effects of stock splits, controlling for other confounding factors. Following this work, 
Kothari and Warner (2006:8) observe that the general statistical format of event studies has remained 
the same over time.  
 
The steps taken when implementing an event study are outlined in Mackinlay (1997:14).  The initial 
step requires the researcher to identify the event of interest and to specify the event date defined as 
the exact date of the event (Nageswara Rao & Sreejith, 2014:42). Next the researcher has to identify 
the event window and estimation period. An event window is the period in which the impact of an 
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event is examined; it includes some days before and after the event as well as the event date itself. 
According to Mackinlay (1997:15), defining the event window in this way allows researchers to also 
study the periods around the event.  
 
The estimation period, on the other hand, includes the periods preceding the event window. The 
event window is generally excluded from the estimation window to avoid any influence of the event 
on expected normal returns. The purpose of defining an estimation period is to calculate the normal 
(or expected) return on the variable being examined. The expected return represents what would 
normally occur in the absence of the event. It is this value that is compared with the actual return 
recorded in the event window in order to measure the unusual performance.  
 
The abnormal yield is then derived by subtracting the actual from the expected return, over the event 
window. Once the returns are calculated, the econometric design for testing the significance of the 
abnormal returns is then selected. A number of researchers conducting event studies make use of 
parametric t-statistics to establish whether the abnormal return is indistinguishable from zero. The 
empirical results provide insights as to whether the event being studied had any impact on the 
behaviour of assets.  
 
Proponents of event studies base their arguments on ability to isolate the impact of the events 
considered even for shorter windows (Moore et al., 2013:6). While event studies have been found to 
be very useful in explaining the impact of events, they have some major limitations worth noting.  
 
First, the assumption that markets are efficient may not hold in some instances.12 When market 
efficiency is not observed, prices may not fully and instantaneously reflect all information, including 
the event. Moreover, market participants may anticipate the incidence of an event while other 
confounding events could also impact on the variable being investigated (Nageswara Rao & Sreejith, 
2014:42). For example, because most of the QE announcements were made weeks and sometimes 
months prior to the actual operations, Fratzscher et al. (2013:12) argue that it is likely that asset 
markets may have to a certain degree adjusted, prior to the actual event. Therefore, it is likely that 
any abnormal behaviour in the asset markets may not necessarily be the result of market reaction to 
the specific event being investigated. 
                                                   
12
 This is not necessarily a shortcoming of the event study methodology, but of the efficient market hypothesis.  
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 Second, failure to correctly identify event and estimation windows may reduce the statistical power 
of event studies. Event dates are not easy to identify, especially when the information is being 
retrieved from metadata. Mackinlay (1997:37) notes that instances when it is difficult to identify the 
event date or where it is partially anticipated may result in biased estimates. Nageswara Rao and 
Sreejith (2014:42) argue that narrow event windows are more efficient than larger windows.  
 
Like event windows, estimation windows are also difficult to determine and even when correctly 
identified may be subject to confounding effects, especially when the period is too long. Moore et al. 
(2013:6) point to the difficulty faced in selecting event windows that are wide enough to include the 
complete market reaction, but narrow enough to exclude the influence of other factors.  
 
Commenting on the use of event methods, Ahmed and Zlate (2013:9) argue that focusing only on 
periods of sudden stops and surges makes it difficult to identify how much of the abnormal behaviour 
of capital flows is due to oversized movements in the factors that influence these flows when markets 
normalise. Moreover, they argue that examining capital flows during periods of abnormal behaviour 
may make it hard to understand how the drivers of capital flows may have evolved.  
 
Because of the difficulties associated with event studies, some have opted for other methods to 
estimate the spillover effects of QE on EMEs’ assets, most notably dynamic panel data models. 
Moreover, most of these studies have focused on the effect of actual operations of the Fed and not on 
the announcements.  
A2: Vector Autoregressive Models 
 
VAR models have been identified as an easy tool for studying the transmission of shocks across 
countries. VAR models were developed by Sims (1980) as an alternative to multivariate 
simultaneous equations models that distinguish between endogenous and exogenous variables 
(Abrigo & Love, 2016:1). According to Lutkepohl (2005:66), Sims’s main critique of simultaneous 
equations was centred on the exogeneity assumptions of the variables in the model, which he argued 
were ad hoc and often not supported by fully developed theories. Sims argued that if indeed real 
simultaneity exists among variables, there should be no difference between endogenous and 
exogenous variables (Gujarati, 2004:848).  
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Canova and Ciccarelli (2013:6) argued that Sims overcame the weakness of simultaneous equations 
models by creating a model in which all the variables are a priori endogenous. Although VAR 
models have traditionally been applied to pure time series data, they are increasingly being applied to 
panel data. While panel VARs are built on the basis of similar principles as standard VARs, Canova 
and Ciccarelli (2013:2) argue that they are a much more powerful tool for analysing the transmission 
of shocks across countries. Despite this, studies investigating the impact of QE tapering on capital 
flows have limited their analyses to standard VARs.  
 
 VARs are typically used for forecasting, structural inference and policy analysis. Forecasts obtained 
using VAR models are argued to be better than those derived from more complex simultaneous 
equations models (Gujarati, 2004:53). Moreover, they are easy to estimate given that OLS can be 
applied to each equation separately. VAR models make it possible to identify structural shocks in 
data using variance decompositions, notably the Cholesky decomposition (Kilian, 2011:5). By doing 
this, VARs make it possible to study causal impacts of unexpected shocks in one variable on other 
variables (Lutkepohl, 2001:16). The impacts of such variables are usually examined throughout the 
system using what are known as impulse response functions (Lutkepohl, 2001:16). This aspect of 
VARs makes them suitable for modelling QE tapering on capital flows to EMEs.  
 
Despite having several advantages over their counterpart simultaneous equations, VARs are also 
fraught with significant drawbacks. VARs have been criticised for the difficulties faced in choosing 
the appropriate lag length in the specification of the model. Despite the existence of several 
approaches to identify lag lengths, they often derive different results.  This is evident in Burns et al. 
(2014:42), where the Hannan and Quinn information  and Schwartz Bayesian information criteria 
suggested one lag, while the Final Prediction Error and the Akaike Information Criterion 
recommended two and four, respectively.   
 
A final point of contention is related to whether the variables in a VAR should be stationary. 
Opponents of VARs argue that all variables should be stationary if any meaningful hypothesis tests 
and tests of significance are to be conducted (Brooks, 2008:292). However, proponents of VARs 
argue that applying transformation techniques such as differencing, could result in the loss of 
valuable information (Gujarati, 2002:853).  Brooks (2008:293) argues that doing so would go against 
the sole purpose of VAR estimation, which is to examine the relationships between variables. It is for 
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this reason that VARs are argued to perform better when the aim is to describe the data rather than 
when it is used for policy analysis.  
 
Table A1: Variable List for Panel Data Model of Capital Flows 
Variable Source 
Gross Private Capital Inflows IMF Balance of Payments Statistics 
Gross Portfolio Capital Inflows IMF Balance of Payments Statistics 
Gross Foreign Direct Investment Inflows IMF Balance of Payments Statistics 
Gross Bank Inflows Bank for International Settlements Locational 
Banking Statistics 
US Federal Funds Rate US Federal Reserve 
US 3-month T-bill Rate US Federal Reserve 
US 10-year Government Bond Yield US Federal Reserve 
US Money Supply (M2) US Federal Reserve 
Nominal GDP IMF IFS World Development Indicators 
Real GDP Growth IMF IFS World Development Indicators 
Central Bank Balance Sheet Expansion (QE) US Federal Reserve Bank and IMF IFS 
Country Credit Ratings Institutional Investor Ratings 
BRICS Monetary Policy Rates IMF IFS and National Central Banks 
Chicago Board of Options Exchange Volatility 
Index (VIX) 
Chicago Board of Options Exchange 
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Table A2: Linear Transformation of S&P’s Sovereign Credit Ratings 
 
Source: Bhatia (2002)  
Note: -- Not applicable 
 
 
  
Long-term Ratings Short-term Ratings 
Rating Conversion Rating Conversion 
Investment Grades 
AAA 20 A-1+ 6 
AA+ 19 A-1 5 
AA 18 A-2 4 
AA- 17 A-3 3 
A+ 16   
A 15   
A- 14   
BBB+ 13   
BBB 12   
BBB- 11   
Speculative Grades 
BB+ 10 B 2 
BB 9 C 1 
BB- 8 D/SD 0 
B+ 7   
B 6   
B- 5   
CCC+ 4   
CCC 3   
CCC- 2   
CC 1   
D/SD 0   
Outlook for Long-term Ratings 
Outlook Conversion 
Credit Watch-Positive 0.5 
Positive 0.25 
Stable 0 
Negative -0.25 
Credit Watch-Negative -0.5 
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Table A3: Regressions for Gross Capital Inflows (2001Q1-2015Q4) 
 
 
Variable Name Coefficient 
Lagged inflows 0.2108  (0.000)*** 
All QE Episodes 0.0441 (0.016) 
3-month T-bill rate -0.0378 (0.208) 
Yield Curve 0.0335 (0.130) 
VIX -0.0032 (0.014)** 
Money supply (M2) -0.0239 (0.571) 
BRICS GDP Growth 0.0279 (0.043)** 
Advanced Economy GDP Growth -0.0241(0.090)* 
Interest Rate Differential 0.0009 (0.870) 
Growth Differential -0.0248(0.058)* 
BRICS GDP 0.0032 (0.732) 
BRICS Country Institutional Rating 0.0300 (0.000)*** 
Constant 
20.7056 (0.000)*** 
Note 1: 3-month T-bill rate, yield curve and interest rate differential are differenced once. Note: All level variables are in 
logarithmic form, but rates and indicator variables are untransformed. P-values are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * represent 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
